JURIES AND EXPERT EVIDENCE: SOCIAL
FRAMEWORK TESTIMONY
NEIL J. VIDMAR* AND REGINA

A.

SCHULLERt

I
INTRODUCTION

During the past decade and a half, courts have been faced with an
increasing number of attempts to have social science experts testify about
such matters as eyewitness unreliability, post-traumatic stress disorders, or
cross-cultural differences in the meaning of behavior. The purpose of the
testimony, to which Walker and Monahan have given the generic label of
"social framework evidence" in order to distinguish it from other forms of
social science evidence,' is to provide the factfinder, usually a jury, with
information about the social and psychological context in which contested
adjudicative facts occurred. It is presumed that knowledge about the context
will help the factfinder interpret the contested adjudicative facts.
Courts dealing with the various types of social framework evidence have
raised common concerns about both the extent to which such evidence may
be helpful to the jury and the extent to which any probative assistance it
provides may be outweighed by its prejudicial impact.2 Central to these
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1. Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks: A .New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REv. 559,
560 (1987) [hereinafter Walker & Monahan]. See also Faigman, To Have and Have .ot: Assessing the
Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Polico, 38 EMORY L. REV. 1005 (1989); Monahan & Walker,
Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477
(1986); Monahan & Walker, Social Science Research in Law. A New Paradigm, 43 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 465,
470-71 (1988); Walker & Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific iethodology as Legal Precedent, 76 CALIF. L.
REV. 877, 879 (1988).
2. For cases dealing with eyewitness reliability, see United States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176,
1181-83 (9th Cir. 1986) (Ferguson, C.J., dissenting); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153
(9th Cir. 1973); Nelson v. State, 362 So. 2d 1017, 1021 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("[I]t is within the
common knowledge of the jury that a person being attacked and beaten undergoes stress that might
cloud a subsequent identification of the assailant ....
As such, the subject matter was not properly
within the realm of expert testimony."); Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 764, 208 S.E.2d 850, 852-53
(1974); Pankey v. Commonwealth, 485 S.W.2d 513, 522 (Ky. 1972) ([E]yewitness expert testimony
"constitutes an invasion of the province of the jury in assessing the credibility of the witness."); State
v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939, 945 (La. 1982) ("Such testimony invades the province of the jury and
usurps its function."); Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142, 148, 576 P.2d 275, 278-79 (1978) (noting "a
substantial risk that the potential persuasive appearance of [the expert] would have had a greater
influence on the jury than the evidence presented at trial, thereby interfering with the province of the
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concerns are empirical questions about how juries receive and process the
evidence given to them.
This article reviews empirical research bearing on the impact of three
types of social framework evidence on jury decisionmaking: battered woman
syndrome, rape trauma syndrome, and eyewitness unreliability. Despite the
diversity of these substantive topics, some common patterns of jury behavior
in response to social framework evidence emerge from the surveyed research.
These patterns point to a tentative conclusion that juries can utilize social
framework evidence in a legally appropriate manner. There are, however,
some inconsistencies in the data and deficiencies in the research literature.
Part II of this article discusses the nature of social framework evidence and
provides a broader conceptualization of it than that offered by Walker and
Monahan. Part III discusses legal concerns about the evidence and
conceptualizes them for empirical analysis. Part III also provides a brief
overview of the social psychology of jury decisionmaking and how it may be
affected by the introduction of social framework evidence. Part IV reviews
research on the impact of evidence about battered woman syndrome, rape
trauma syndrome, and eyewitness unreliability, as well as other research about
how juries respond to expert evidence. Part V discusses the limitations of the
research and offers suggestions for improving our knowledge about the
impact of social framework evidence on juries.
II
THE NATURE OF SOCIAL FRAMEWORK EVIDENCE

Laurens Walker and John Monahan developed the concept of "social
framework" to capture the similarities among certain types of social science evidence and to distinguish social framework evidence from other
uses of social science in law. 3 A partial list of evidence that would qualify
as social framework evidence would include testimony on eyewitness
reliability, 4 predictions of dangerousness, 5 battered woman synjury"); State v. Onorato, 142 Vt. 99, 104, 453 A.2d 393, 395 (1982) ("[I]t would be of little real help
to the jury but might be given great weight because of its so-called expert status, thereby invading
the province of the jury."). For cases involving battered woman syndrome, see Ibn-Tamas v. United
States, 407 A.2d 626, 632-35 (D.C. 1979); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); State
v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895, 899 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 132-35, 488
N.Y.S.2d 358, 361-63 (Supreme Ct., Bronx County 1985); State v.Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 52022, 423 N.E.2d 137, 138-40 (1981); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1376-68 (Wyo. 1981). For cases
involving the rape trauma syndrome, see State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 168-71, 689 P.2d 822,
827-29 (1984); State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 653-55, 647 P.2d 1291, 1298-1300 (1982); Allewalt v.
State, 61 Md. App. 503, 514-16, 487 A.2d 664, 669-70 (1985); State v. McGee, 324 N.W.2d 232, 23334 (Minn. 1982); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229-31 (Minn. 1982); State v. Black, 109 Wash.
2d 336, 342-48, 745 P.2d 12, 15-19 (1987).
3. See Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 559.
4. See, e.g., E. LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); A. YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY (1979); McClosky, Egeth & McKenna, The Experimental Psychologist in Court:

The Ethics of Expert Testimony, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1986); Penrod & Cutler, Eyewitness Expert
Testimony and Jury Decisionmaking, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 43.
5. For a discussion of specific social framework evidence used to predict dangerousness, see
Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 559, 566.
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drome, 6 rape trauma syndrome, 7 behavioral and psychological symptoms of
sexually abused children, 8 battered child syndrome, 9 "brainwashed"
2
defendants,' 0 Vietnam veterans syndrome,'' discriminatory behavior,'
4
effects of cultural stress,' 3 and psycholinguistic meaning.'
Despite the wide variety of substantive topics and the use of the evidence
for different litigation goals,' 5 all this evidence shares the common
characteristic of employing general conclusions drawn from social science
research to help evaluate factual issues in a specific case.' 6 In each instance,
the evidence involves general assertions about some aspect of human
behavior that is intended to help the trier of fact, usually a jury, 17 to interpret
the meaning of some disputed fact or testimony at issue in the suit.
In theory, social framework testimony does not bear directly on the
ultimate fact to be decided by the trier; rather, it provides a social and
psychological context in which the trier can understand and evaluate claims
about the ultimate fact.' 8 Thus, a psychologist called to testify about potential
eyewitness unreliability does not assert that the eyewitness in the particular
case is wrong, only that studies of perception and recall indicate that people in
6. See C. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL (1987); L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME (1984); Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and Self Defense: A Legal and EmpiricalDissent, 72
VA. L. REV. 619 (1986).
7. See Burgess & Holstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, 131 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY 981 (1974); Massaro,
Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implicationsfor Expert
Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN. L. REV. 395 (1985). For a review of cases and other discussion, see
alsoJ. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 228-62 (1985).
8. See McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A
Foray Into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1986);
Mosteller, Legal Doctrines Governing the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning Social Framework
Evidence, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 85.

9.

See Hicks, Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Psychology of the Battered Child, 11 LAW &

PSYCHOLOGY REV.

103 (1987).

10. Delgado, Ascription of CriminalStates of Mind: Toward a Defense Theory for the Coercively Persuaded
("Brainwashed") Defendant, 63 MINN. L. REV. I (1978).
11. See Erlinder, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Vietnam Veterans and the Law: A Challenge to Effective
Representation, 1 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 25 (1983); Wilson & Zigelbaum, The Vietnam Veteran on Trial:
The Relation of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder to Criminal Behavior, I BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 69 (1983).
12. Goodman & Croyle, Social Framework Testimony in Employment Discrimination Cases, 7
BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 227 (1989).
13. See Rosen, The Anthropologist as Expert Witness, 79 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 555, 567-69 (1977);
Note, The Availability of the "Cultural Defense "as an Excusefor Criminal Behavior, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 335 (1986); Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1293 (1986).

14.

See Gumperz, Fact and Inference in Courtroom Testimony, in

LANGUAGE AND SOCIAL IDENTITY

U.

Gumperz ed. 1982); Rosen, supra note 13, at 567; Swett, Cultural Bias in the American Legal System, 4
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 79 (1969).
15. The potential uses of social framework testimony are as varied as inventive lawyers can
devise within the constraints of evidentiary rules and policies. The testimony might be used to
provide guidance about whether a future, present, or past event at issue at trial was more or less
probable; it might be employed by either party in a criminal or civil suit; and it might pertain to
plaintiffs, complainants, victims, defendants, or witnesses. See generally J. MONAHAN & L. WALKER,
supra note 7.
16. See Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 570.
17. Judges might equally benefit from the expert evidence if they are ignorant of certain social
science findings about human behavior.
18. See Mosteller, supra note 8, at text accompanying note 85; Walker & Monahan, supra note 1,
at 563-71, 580-83; see also Mosteller, supra note 8, at text in Parts IV.A.2 and IV. B.
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similar contexts are often wrong.' 9 To cite another example, an expert called
to testify about rape trauma syndrome, in a case where the defendant disputes
the complainant's testimony that she did not consent to sexual intercourse,
describes studies on the characteristic reactions and behavior patterns of
women who have been sexually assaulted. Although in some instances the
expert may also be allowed to indicate that the complainant herself exhibits
these characteristic symptoms, 20 the testimony revolves around characteristics
of a class of persons, sexual assault victims. The factfinder may then use this
information to evaluate case-specific evidence.
Several matters regarding the conceptualization of social framework
evidence need to be discussed at this point. First, as Walker and Monahan
observe, not only is the basic thrust of social framework evidence probabilistic
in nature, it may also address past, present, or future events. 2 ' Where
eyewitness reliability is in dispute, the issue is whether the eyewitness is
mistaken about a past event. Testimony about dangerousness, of course,
represents a judgment about future behavior. The expert testimony on
allegations of sexual abuse of a child may relate to the validity of the child's
current retraction of previous allegations. Social framework evidence,
therefore, is not bounded by time constraints.
A second characteristic of social framework evidence is that the research is
often, though not invariably, "off the rack." 22 The studies relied upon by the
experts are usually conducted and published well before the disputed events
occurred, and involve persons having no connection to the legal proceeding.
Often the research was never intended for use in a legal setting, but addressed
a problem in another context. For example, the data on rape trauma
syndrome were derived from studies originally intended to help devise
therapeutic measures for rape victims. 2 3 Many of the studies that experts cite
in testimony about the unreliability of eyewitnesses were conducted in
settings and contexts removed from the conditions involved in the
identification offered in the specific case. 24 In our view, however, Walker and
Monahan place too much emphasis on the "off the rack" nature of social
framework evidence. Research intended for social framework applications
can be undertaken with the express purpose of use in a particular case. To
cite one example, in cases where it is suspected that a line-up was biased,
research bearing on the line-up procedure using groups of people having no
connection to the case can be generated specifically for that trial. 25 One can
19. Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 563-64.
20. See Mosteller, supra note 8, at text accompanying footnotes 182-86.
21. Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 574-75; see also Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1344-46 (1971).
22. Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 568.
23. See Burgess & Holstrom, supra note 7.
24. McClosky & Egeth, Eyewitness Identification: What Can a Psychologist Tell a Jury?, 38 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 550, 551-55 (1983).
25. Doob & Kirshenbaum, Bias in Police Lineups-PartialRemembering, I J. POLICE Scl. & ADMIN.
287 (1973); Wells, Leippe & Ostrom, Guidelinesfor Empirically Assessing the Fairness of a Lineup, 3 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 285 (1979).
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easily conceive of litigation-driven social framework research with respect to
other issues. 2 6 In short, "off the rack" research is not a necessary
characteristic of social framework evidence.
Social framework evidence may be based on large sets of systematically
analyzed data bases or simply on clinical experience. Walker and Monahan
cite State v. Davis as an example of a large-scale data set. 2 7 In Davis, a
defendant who pleaded guilty to murder offered the testimony of a sociologist
in the penalty trial, which was held to determine whether the defendant
should be executed or receive a mandatory thirty-year minimum sentence.
The sociologist's opinion was not based upon a personal evaluation of
Davis. 28 Rather, it was based upon published studies and government
statistics indicating that murderers have low rates of recidivism and that
persons of the age Davis would be after serving the mandatory sentence are
unlikely to commit violent crimes. In contrast to these kinds of data, which
are usually summarized by means of computer processing with disaggregation
and probability projections according to type of offense or demographic
characteristics of the offenders, consider Barefoot v. Estelle.29 In Barefoot, the
defendant had been found guilty of murder; in the penalty trial, the
prosecution called two psychiatrists to testify about the probability that
someone like Barefoot would constitute a continuing danger to society. As in
Davis, neither of these experts personally interviewed Barefoot. Unlike Davis,
neither psychiatrist relied on aggregated statistical information. Rather, both
were asked to testify about their own professional experience with convicted
felons and were asked hypothetical questions about the likelihood that
someone with Barefoot's characteristics would commit violence in the
future. 30 The data bases were statistical only in the sense that they involved
an aggregation of the psychiatrists' own clinical experience with similar
persons. Yet, in both Davis and Barefoot, the evidence referred to empirical
3
relationships beyond the confines of the particular case. '
Thus, the data bases from which social framework evidence is drawn vary
along continuums of rigor and size. The type of data, the specific profession
of the expert who presents the data, and other factors may affect how the jury
26. For social framework evidence to be useful, the case might actually require generating data
where none currently exist-for example, rates of recidivism in groups of persons with certain
demographic characteristics, or cultural meanings of behavior to particular members of a subculture.
The possibilities for special data collection are, in fact, constrained only by the limits of time, money,
and expertise.
27. Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 565, 569-70.
28. Id. at 568 n.23.
29. 463 U.S. 880 (1983). See also Ewing, "Dr. Death" and the Casefor an Ethical Ban on Psychiatric
and Psychological Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 8 AM. J. L. & MED. 407
(1983); Marquart, Ekland-Olson & Sorensen, Gazing into the Crystal Ball. Can Jurors Accurately Predict
Dangerousness in Capital Cases?, 23 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 449 (1989).
30. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 884-85.
31. For more extensive comparison of "statistical" versus "clinical" assessments, see P. MEEHL,
CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
(1954); Faust & Ziskin, The Expert Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241 SCIENCE 31 (1988);
Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized
Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979).
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receives and uses the evidence. Conceptually, however, social framework
evidence can be defined solely by its function: to supply the triers with
information about some aspect of human behavior to aid in interpreting
32
disputed facts.
III
LEGAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL FRAMEWORK
EVIDENCE ON THE JURY

Although social framework evidence involves different substantive topics
and is tendered for different litigation goals, some common concerns
regarding its impact on the jury have emerged. Two specific concerns are the
extent to which the evidence may be helpful to the jury and the extent to
which its impact may be more prejudicial than probative. 3 3 Robert
Mosteller's article, which appears elsewhere in this issue, thoroughly discusses
the legal doctrines bearing on these concerns and the rationales underlying
them. 3 4 Therefore, the first section of Part III summarizes those concerns that
speak directly to the jury's factfinding functions, then conceptualizes them for
empirical analysis. 35 The second section discusses research strategies for
evaluating these issues empirically. The third section describes contemporary
social psychological perspectives on jury decisionmaking processes that bear
on the legal concerns. The ideas developed in this part provide a perspective
for critiquing the research involving juries and social framework evidence,
which isthe subject of the final part of the article.
A.

Evidentiary Concerns

Professor Mosteller points out that legal concerns with social framework
36
evidence derive from the normative goals the jury trial is intended to serve.
The different evidentiary rules and their underlying doctrines have evolved
gradually, and address overlapping issues, which in themselves may be
contradictory. Yet, in order to understand and examine the empirical
assertions implicit in these evidentiary doctrines, researchers must spell them
32. As a practical matter, Davis and Barefoot probably define the extremes of a continuum. Most
social framework testimony will combine the expert's professional experience and clinical
observations of the relevant categories of persons with hard statistical data derived from his or her
own research and the research of others.
33. See Acker & Toch, Battered Women, Straw-Men, and Expert Testimony: A Comment on State v.
Kelly, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 125, 143 (1985); McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica. A New
Approach to the Admissibility of NontraditionalPsychologicalEvidence in CriminalCases, 66 OR. L. REV. 19, 8894 (1987); Mosteller, supra note 8, at Parts IIB, C; Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 575-80.
34. Mosteller, supra note 8.
35. Other concerns may include the scientific reliability and validity of the evidence, the amount
of trial time that might be absorbed by the testimony, the development of a "battle of experts," or
concerns about the perception of fairness. See id. at Parts I and If.See also Goodman, Demographic
Evidence in Capital Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 499 (1987); Lempert, Social Science in Court: On
"Eyewitness Experts" and Other Issues, 10 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 167 (1986); Tribe, supra note 21.
36. Mosteller, supra note 8, at note 86 and accompanying text.
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out in such a way that they can be observed and measured. 3 7 Then strategies
of observation and measurement must be devised. The following discussion
summarizes these evidentiary concerns and proposes means of observation
and measurement.
At the outset, one significant assumption about social framework evidence
should be made explicit: that a specific body of knowledge exists and that at
least some persons, considered to be expert in the field, concur about its basic
nature. This is an arguable assumption, and indeed some critiques have
contested its validity in relation to each of the three areas reviewed in the next
section.3 8 We justify our assumption here on the grounds that it is necessary
to our analysis of potential jury behavior, and that court decisions and
empirical research frequently point to the existence of such a body of
knowledge.
Our analytical scheme draws upon the two legal concerns-the
"helpfulness" of the evidence and whether it is "more probative than
prejudicial"-and discusses them in terms of five issues. Two issues relate to
the "helpfulness" concern: (1) whether the expert evidence provides
knowledge or corrects mistaken ideas, and (2) whether the jurors integrate the
information with their existing knowledge and utilize it. The remaining three
issues address potential prejudicial effects: (3) juror responses to the "aura of
science," (4) impermissible spillover effects on other trial evidence, and (5)
excessive infringement upon the jury's role in determining witness credibility.
1. Providing "Knowledge" to the Jury. The purpose of social framework
evidence, as with any expert evidence, is to assist the trier of fact by providing
information that is either unknown to the trier or potentially at variance with
what the trier believes to be true.3 9 A frequently expressed objection to social
framework evidence is that it contributes little or no new information about
human behavior to the pooled experiences of the jurors. 40 The empirical
question that arises from this assertion, then, is whether there is a discrepancy
37.

This is known as developing an "operational definition" and is essential for testing research

hypotheses. For a general discussion of this process, see F. KERLINGER, FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH 30-35 (1973); P. RUNKEL &J. McGRATH, RESEARCH ON HUMAN BEHAVIOR 150-53 (1972).

38. See infra notes 87-89, 105, 121 and accompanying text.
39. In situations in which social framework evidence is used, the concern is often that jurors may
hold misconceptions about some aspect of human behavior rather than that they have no knowledge.
For instance, it is asserted that jurors are inclined to believe that there is a positive correlation
between an eyewitness' confidence and the accuracy of an eyewitness identification. In fact, research
shows that this assumption is often questionable. See Lindsay, Wells & O'Connors, Mock-Juror Belief of
Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A Replication and Extension, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1989).
Similarly, it is said that laypersons often have misconceptions about rape victims. Burt, CulturalMyths
and Supports For Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 217 (1980); Tetreault, Rape Myth
Acceptance: A Casefor Providing EducationalExpert Testimony in RapeJur Trials, 7 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L.
243 (1989). Jurors also have misconceptions about the credibility of child witnesses. See Goodman,
Golding & Haitli,Jurors'Reactions to Child IVitnesses, J. SoC. ISSUES, Apr.-June 1984, at 139.
40. See, e.g., Acker & Toch, supra note 33, at 136-43; McClosky & Egeth, supra note 24; Comment,
Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND.
L.J. 1253, 1260-69 (1987).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 52: No. 4

between the body of expert knowledge and the knowledge or assumptions
made by lay persons, and, if so, the magnitude of the discrepancy.
Whatever discrepancies are uncovered between lay knowledge and the
specific body of expert knowledge do not address the normative task of
determining the threshold below which laypersons should be adjudged
ignorant or misinformed. The quantification, however, does provide data
around which the normative questions may be debated.
2. Acceptance, Integration, and Utilization. Assume that jurors do lack social
context information known by experts, or that they hold misinformation
about it, and that the expert is allowed to testify at trial. There are still
questions about whether jurors are capable of accepting the evidence, of
integrating it with the other information they possess, and of utilizing it in
their decisionmaking. While this issue seldom receives much explicit
attention in legal commentary or in psychological research on jury
decisionmaking, 4 1 there are a number of possible reasons why a jury might
not use the expert testimony. The jurors simply may not understand the
evidence and, therefore, ignore it entirely. Alternatively, the jurors may
understand the evidence but not see its relevance. Thus, they might hear an
expert testify about the typical reactions of victims of sexual abuse, but not
grasp how it might apply to the complainant in the case they are deciding.
This possibility is recognized in arguments that favor allowing the expert to
establish a link between the general framework evidence and the witness in
question. The arguments suggest that this link be forged by using
hypothetical fact examples or by tendering an opinion that the subject witness
exhibits characteristics corresponding to the group profile data that form the
42
basis of the expert testimony.

A third possibility is that even though the jurors might understand the
testimony and see its relevance, they nevertheless may reject it because it is in
direct conflict with their pre-existing beliefs. 4 3 Thus, for example, a juror who
believed that "women usually provoke rape" might refuse even to consider
contrary evidence bearing on sexual assault.
Still another possibility is that the expert evidence could be rejected
because it is tendered after the juror has already formed an opinion about the
witness who is the focus of the social framework testimony. The dynamics
underlying the rejection of the evidence in this instance are similar to those

4 1. See Penrod & Cutler, supra note 4, at Parts VI and VII.
42. See, e.g., Mosteller, supra note 8, at notes 109-14 and accompanying text; see also Fox &
Walters, The Impact of General Versus Specific Expert Testimony and Eyewitness Confidence upon Mock Juror
Judgment, 10 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 215 (1986).
43. See Penrod & Cutler, supra note 4, at Parts V.C.4, V.D. The phenomenon whereby people
may reject valid information that is at odds with their pre-existing beliefs has been studied for over
five decades and is well documented. See, e.g., M. SHERIF & C. HOVELAND, SOCIAL JUDGMENT:
ASSIMILATION AND CONTRAST EFFECTS IN COMMUNICATION AND ATTITUDE CHANGE (1961).
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involved with jurors who have pretrial biases, except that in this case the
44
preformed opinion arises out of the trial process itself.
Finally, the jury might ignore or reject the evidence because of the form in
which it is delivered to the jury. Social framework evidence may be
transmitted to jurors through expert testimony or through judicial
instructions. While the issue of whether a judge should instruct the jury on
matters relating to witness evidence is not new, Walker and Monahan's
proposal that social framework evidence should be delivered by a judge will
certainly increase debate on this matter. 4 5 For purposes of this discussion,
the crucial point is that the form of presentation may affect a juror's
willingness to accept or make use of social framework evidence.
3. The Impact of Science. Social framework evidence is derived from attempts
to systematize and quantify aspects of human behavior. Its use therefore
evokes more general legal concerns about the impact of scientific information
on thejury. These concerns raise questions about the jury's ability to evaluate
the merits of the body of knowledge and about the "misleading aura of
science," or, in other words, the jury's proclivity to overvalue scientific
46
testimony.
In circumstances where the assessment of the reliability and validity of the
scientific information is left to the jury rather than to the court, a basic issue is
whether the jury has the intellectual capacity to evaluate and apply scientific
methodology to the forensic setting. 4 7 The potential for confusion may be
compounded when the expert is cross-examined on the underlying basis of
her judgment, when a "battle of experts" results, or when the technique
involves "fancy" instrumentation. 48 Assessing jury capabilities in this regard
requires determining how juries respond to questions about the
methodological adequacy of the evidence.
44. Schwarzer, Communicating With Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 731, 754-55
(1981).
45. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 554-57 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Doyle, Applying Lawyers'
Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some Thoughts About Trial Court Analysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting
and Excluding Expert Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 637-40, 649-52 (1984); Saltzburg,
A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Aegative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CALIF.
L. REv. 1011, 1057-60 (1978); Schwarzer, supra note 44, at 744-47; Walker & Monahan, supra note 1,
at 592-98.
46. See Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer on Evaluating the
Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261, 274-83 (1981) [hereinafter Scientific Evidence];
Imwinkelried, Judge V/ersus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning the
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 577, 580, 595-606 (1984) [hereinafter
Imwinkelried]; Mosteller, supra note 8, at Part II.C.
47. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1237 (1980); Imwinkelried, supra note 46, at 580, 595-606;
Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the Perspective of Juror
Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REv. 554, 560-64 (1982-83); Mosteller, supra note 8, at Parts II.B, C.
48. lmwinkelried, supra note 46, at 598-606. Social framework evidence will be unlikely to
involve hardware other than a computer for processing the data. However, the measurement
theories underlying the research, the statistical analyses of the data, and other methodological factors
can be difficult to understand for persons not trained in the social sciences. See THE EVOLVING ROLE
OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS (S. Fienberg ed. 1989).
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A second, related concern is whether the jury will evaluate the merits of
'4 9
the testimony using what Rosenthal has called the expert's "paramessage.
Simply put, do jurors ignore the evidence itself and instead rely on the
credentials and demeanor of the expert and what they perceive to be her or
his conclusions? A third concern is whether the jury will attach so much
weight to the expert testimony that it will not give adequate weight to its own
collective, intuitive experience, or, worse, will interpret the expert's testimony
50
as dispositive of the trial issues.
4. Impact on Other Evidence and Decision Standards. Even if the jury
appropriately understands the scientific basis of the evidence and approaches
it with caution, social framework evidence could have inappropriate
consequences for other evidence or for the standards against which the
evidence is to be judged. This could occur in a number of ways.
The testimony might cause the jury to ignore or discount other evidence
that is worthy of consideration. This phenomenon would result if the expert
evidence were used as the primary standard against which to evaluate other
evidence. For example, testimony bearing on the reactions of the
complainant in a sexual assault case might cause the jurors to negatively
evaluate evidence supporting the defendant's version of events. Similarly,
expert testimony about eyewitness unreliability might cause the jurors to
conclude that all eyewitnesses are unreliable, without considering other
51
factors that point toward accuracy in the present case.
The evidence might also cause the jury to draw legally inappropriate
conclusions about character. The Federal Rules of Evidence strictly proscribe
the use of character evidence as a means of proving action in conformity with
a dispositional tendency. 5 2 This proscription is based on the theory that such
evidence is likely to be irrelevant. 53 Since social framework evidence offers
conclusions about propensities of a category of persons, if jurors decide that
the witness is a member of that category, they may impermissibly conclude
that the witness' action or state of mind was a result of a dispositional
propensity. Used in this way, social framework evidence is very similar to
evidence of specific character traits used to prove action in conformity
54
therewith.
The evidence might also confuse the jurors on matters pertaining to the
legal standards. As Professor Mosteller points out, 5 5 in a sexual assault case

where the accused argues that the victim consented to sexual intercourse, the
49. Rosenthal, Nature ofJur , Response to the Expert Witness, 28J. FORENSIC Sci. 528, 529 (1983); see
also Egesdal, The Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An Empirical Investigation, 74 GEO.
L.J. 1769 (1986); Woocher, Legal Principles Governing Expert Testimony by Experimental Psychologists, 10
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 47, 57 (1986).

50.
51.

Mosteller, supra note 8, at Part II.C.
Id.; see also Penrod & Cutler, supra note 4, at Part VI.C.

52.

FED. R. EvID. 608.

53.
54.
55.

Id. at Note.
Mosteller, supra note 8, at Part I.D; Walker & Monahan, supra note 1, at 580-82.
Mosteller, supra note 8.
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legal issue in many states centers upon the defendant's state of mindnamely, did he reasonably believe that the complainant was consenting to
sexual intercourse? However, the expert testimony might cause the jury to
believe instead that the crime is legally defined as being concerned with the
complainant's state of mind rather than the defendant's reasonable, good
faith perception.

56

5. Excessive Impact on the Determination of Credibility. Social framework
evidence is intended to be used for a limited purpose, namely to provide a
context for evaluating the testimony of a witness. It should not be used to
assess witness credibility, which is solely the task of thejury. 5 7 Concern about
infringing excessively upon the jury's function in this regard forms the basis
for prohibiting the expert from using terminology that might imply that a
legal act did occur (for example, by requiring that the expert discuss posttraumatic stress disorder rather than the rape trauma syndrome 58 ). This
concern also underlies the limitations on how far the testimony may go in
providing a cognitive link between the normative data and the witness to
whom the data have relevance. 59 In other words, if the jury relies too heavily
or exclusively on the expert evidence to determine credibility, the impact of
the testimony would be considered improper.
B.

Research Strategies

At least five different strategies can be devised to assess empirically the
discrepancy between lay knowledge or belief and the body of expert
knowledge. 60 One strategy is to cull the studies in the relevant social science
area, select the findings upon which there is general agreement, and develop a
test in multiple choice or some other format. The test can be given to groups
of laypersons, and their responses can be scored against the "correct"
answers derived from the literature. 6 I A variation on this strategy is to
56. Id. at notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
57. Id. at Part ILE; see infra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
58. See People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 681 P.2d 291, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1984); State v.
Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 517 A.2d 741 (1986); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1984); Mosteller,
supra note 8, at note 46.
59. See, e.g., People v. Poddar, 26 Cal. App. 3d 438, 103 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1974), vacated on other
grounds, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 518 P.2d 342, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1974) (anthropologist permitted to testify
about general facts of cross-cultural differences but not to direct consequences of cultural stress);
Mosteller, supra note 8, at note 57 and accompanying text; infra notes 128-58 and accompanying text.
60. Penrod & Cutler, supra note 4, at Part V.B; Wells, How Adequate is Human Intuition for Judging
Eyewitness Testimony?, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (G. Wells & E. Loftus
eds. 1984) [hereinafter Human Intuition]; Wells, Expert Psychological Testimony: Empirical and Conceptual
Analyses of Effects, 10 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 83 (1986) [hereinafter Wells]; Yarmey & Jones, Is the
Psychology of Eyewitness Identification a Matter of Common Sense?, in EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE (S.
Lloyd-Bostock & B. Clifford eds. 1983), also discuss research strategies bearing on the assessment of
juror knowledge about social framework evidence and its impact on their decisions.
61. The validity of the "test" obviously depends upon choosing questions and answers upon
which researchers agree. Another difficulty involves multiple-choice formats. As Penrod and Cutler,
supra note 4, at 54, correctly point out, such tests may overestimate the knowledge that jurors have,
because the questions may sensitize them to the importance of factors that might otherwise remain
latent as they consider trial evidence.
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identify groups of experts in the relevant area and then administer the test to
them. The responses of the laypersons can then be compared to those of the
experts. A particular advantage of this second strategy is that it permits
62
estimation of the degree of consensus among the experts.
A third strategy is to describe to laypersons the conditions of a
psychological experiment or the conditions of some other setting in which
data on human behavior have been collected. The laypersons, ignorant of the
outcomes of the research, are asked to predict how the people in the
experiment or study responded. The laypersons' predictions are then
compared to the actual data collected in the study. 63
A fourth strategy is to question actual jurors who served in trials involving
the issues that could have been, but were not, addressed by social framework
evidence, and to attempt to determine after the fact whether the jurors had
adequate knowledge or held beliefs at variance with expert knowledge. This
strategy could be more useful if the sample of jurors involved some who
participated in trials where no expert testimony was tendered and some who
heard expert testimony bearing on the issue.
A final strategy is to conduct simulated trials, varying the presence or
absence of expert testimony and the form or type of testimony permitted.
Individual jurors can then be questioned before and after trial about their
knowledge, and these data can be compared as a function of experimental
conditions. Additionally, the study could require that the jurors deliberate
and that the deliberations be recorded. Subsequent content analysis of the
deliberations can quantify the amount of information and misinformation
64
expressed by the jurors, again comparing across the conditions.
Strategies to assess the impact of social framework evidence are more
complicated than strategies for examining the amount of knowledge jurors
possess. Impact must be assessed in two comparative ways: comparison of
the presence or absence of expert testimony, and comparison of how different
parts of the trial evidence are utilized in relation to one another. Thus, while
the ultimate legal concern is with the fairness of the outcome, the more
immediate issue is the jury's decisionmaking processes, and specifically how
the jurors use social framework evidence.
One research strategy is to measure changes in verdicts as a function of
presence or absence of expert testimony or of variations in the form of expert
testimony. This strategy, however, can provide only limited information
about impact. Consider the introduction of evidence about battered woman
syndrome by a defendant who claims self-defense to a murder charge. If the
effect of the expert evidence, when compared to a trial in which no expert
evidence is offered, is to reduce the verdict to a lesser included offense or to

not guilty, the verdicts alone do not indicate why the different result occurred.
The jury may have properly used the evidence in a limited way to assess the
62.
63.
64.

See, e.g., infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Human Intuition, supra note 60, at 262-65.
See infra notes 79, 101, 118 and accompanying text.
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defendant's credibility, or may have improperly relied exclusively on the
expert evidence as dispositive on the issue of her state of mind. 65
A second strategy is to draw inferences about the process of
decisionmaking by comparing expert testimony in conjunction with other
variables. Consider expert testimony on battered woman syndrome in selfdefense cases. Ifjurors are not being overwhelmed by expert testimony, then
they should be sensitive to other evidence such as the degree of planning.
This sensitivity should be reflected both in verdicts and in jurors' judgments
on the merits of other evidence. Thus, ifjurors are not being overwhelmed by
expert evidence, we should expect them to give it less credence, and
consequently for it to have less impact on verdicts, under conditions where
battered woman syndrome is less relevant to the facts of the case. Studies can
compare the presence or absence of social framework testimony (or the form
of the testimony) in interaction with variables specific to the case. To the
extent that verdicts (or judgments of evidence) vary from the pattern that
proper legal usage would predict, we can infer that the jurors are using the
evidence improperly. This strategy could be used with statistical data derived
from actual juries or simulations. The weakness of the strategy, however, is
that the data derived from the comparisons allow only an indirect inference
66
about how the jurors used the evidence in arriving at a verdict.

Another research strategy for investigating jury decisionmaking processes
is one that directly assesses how jurors use the expert evidence and the weight
that it is given in relation to other evidence. This strategy involves
interviewing actual or mock jurors after they have been exposed to variations
in expert testimony conditions. Such studies can provide important insights
into questions about how jurors used the evidence, and specifically about how
much weight they accorded various pieces of evidence. However, such studies
are subject to criticism because they are conducted after the fact and depend
67
on the juror's memory and interpretation of how the evidence was used.
A final strategy is to examine the use of the evidence during the
deliberation process itself. Such a strategy precludes the study of real juries.
While simulation studies are subject to concerns about artificiality and
generalizability to a real-world setting, they nevertheless allow examination of
the basic social psychological processes that are the focus of legal concern.
Thus, systematic analysis ofjury deliberations can show how much time jurors

65.

See Saunders, Vidmar & Hewitt, Eyewitness Testimony and the Discrediting Effect, in EVALUATING

WITNESS EVIDENCE, supra note 60, at 71-76; Human Intuition, supra note 60, for similar critiques
regarding the impact of expert testimony about eyewitness reliability.

66. See Penrod & Cutler, supra note 4, for an example of the strategy. See also H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 482-89 (1966); Zeisel, Reflections on Experimental Techniques in the Law, 2J.
LEGAL STUD. 107 (1973), for other examples and discussion of this inferential strategy.

67. See R. NISBETr & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL
JUDGMENT (1980); Nisbett & Wilson, Telling Afore Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Iental Processes,
84 PSYCHOLOGICAL RE'. 231 (1977); Slovic & Fischhoff, On the Psychology of Experimental Surprises, 3J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: HUMAN PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE 544 (1977).
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devote to the various pieces of evidence, how they scrutinize it, and how they
consider it in relation to other evidence. 6 8
C.

The Psychological Process of Jury Decisionmaking

Legal analyses of jury decisionmaking, while recognizing that the task of
integrating evidence and applying the law is a complex process fraught with
potential hazards, seldom attempt to view the process in a holistic way. Social
psychologists have developed models of the decisionmaking process, which
are useful in addressing legal concerns about the impact of social framework
evidence. Specifically, research and theoretical work indicate that the
evidence and legal instructions provided to the jury during the trial are
interdependent, such that changes in the presentation of one aspect of
evidence is likely to create changes in the interpretation of other aspects.
Moreover, the process of integrating the evidence and the law is a
constructive or interpretive one in which the jurors bring their personal
experiences to bear. A brief review of the social psychology of this process
leads to the hypothesis that we should not expect other trial evidence to
remain uninfluenced by social framework testimony.
There are a number of models of juror decisionmaking processes, 6 9 but
the most widely accepted model evolved from the work of Bennett, an
anthropologist. He observed criminal trials in an attempt to determine the
meanings that were given to the trial evidence. 70 He proposed a model of the
decisionmaking process fashioned around a metaphor of storytelling. 7 ' His
thesis is that jurors employ storytelling practices to organize and guide
interpretation of trial information. The development of the story is guided by
the implicit framework of judgment derived from the juror's life experience.
This framework serves three interpretive functions that the juror must
perform as she listens to the vast amount of trial information: She locates the
central action of the story, she draws inferences regarding the relationship
between key elements of the story, and she then evaluates the internal
consistency and plausibility of the story. 72 The story of the events at issue
emerges out of this interpretive work and is used to fashion the verdict.
Building upon these essential insights as well as on a substantial body of
other research on human decisionmaking processes, Pennington and Hastie
68. See, e.g., Hans & Doob, Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated
Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q 235 (1976); Saunders, Vidmar & Hewitt, supra note 65.
69. See Pennington & Hastie, Juror Decision-Making Models: The Generalization Gap, 89
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 246 (1981); Penrod & Hastie, Models ofJury Decision Making: A Critical Review,
86 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 462 (1979).
70. Bennett, Storytelling in Criminal Trials: A Model of Social Judgment, 64 Q. J. SPEECH 1 (1978)
[hereinafter Storytelling]; see also W. BENNETr & M. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981); Bennett, Rhetorical Transformation
of Evidence in Criminal Trials: Creating Grounds for .LegalJudgment, 65 Q J. SPEECH 311 (1979).
71. Storytelling, supra note 70.
72. ld.
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developed an elaborated model. 73 It describes the jurors' task as consisting of
three stages: a "story construction ' ' 7 4 stage, a "verdict category
representation" 75 stage, and a "story classification"- 76 stage. The first stage,
which begins during the trial and extends into deliberations, involves the
jurors' active organization of the evidence into a story form that describes
what happened. The jurors use their own experience and beliefs about
human behavior and its underlying causes to organize the events brought out
at trial to produce one or more plausible accounts, or stories, of what
occurred. During the second stage, the verdict alternatives or options
outlined by the judge at the conclusion of the trial are developed into
categories with defining features and decision rules that specify how they will
be combined. These decision rules are built around the elements of the legal
charge. 7 7 Finally, during the third stage, the juror searches for the best
possible match between the features of the stories developed in the first stage
and the verdict categories elaborated in the second stage.
Story construction during the first stage of the process, therefore, is crucial
to the two other stages. Moreover, jurors may develop a number of
alternative stories about what occurred. Thejurors draw upon two sources to
construct an interpretation of the events: the evidence brought out at trial
and their "factual" knowledge of the social and physical world. What is
more, their pre-existing attitudes and beliefs influence the way that the trial
evidence is perceived, recalled, and interpreted. There is substantial
empirical support for this proposition. 78 A major portion of jury
73. Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 242 (1986) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation];see also Pennington &
Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision Making: Effects of Memory Structure on Judgment, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOLOGY: LEARNING, MEMORY AND COGNITION 521 (1988); Pennington & Hastie, Practical
Implications of Psychological Research on Juror andJur, Decision MWaking, PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY
BULL. (in press); see also R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983).

74. Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 73, at 242, 243-44.
75. Id. at 244.
76. Id. at 244-45.
77. To best illustrate this decision process, consider the following example provided by
Pennington and Hastie:
Suppose that a person believes that the defendant . . . argued with the victim (initiating
event), became very angry and decided to kill him (psychological state and intention),
obtained a weapon, found the victim, got in a fight and stabbed the victim (actions),
resulting in the victim's death (consequence). Thejuror must decide which verdict category
this story exemplifies by checking the mental state required by a verdict category (e.g.,
intent to kill for first degree murder) against the psychological states and the goals of the
highest level episode of the believed story (intent to kill). There is a clear match in this
example. However, in matching verdict-required circumstances (insufficient provocation)
against the story-initiating events and states (argument), the juror has to judge whether an
argument is an example of sufficient provocation. This matching process continues for all
verdict attributes, for each verdict category. The best fitting verdict category is retained as a
tentative decision.
Id. at 245.
78. E.g., Berg & Vidmar, Authoritarianism and Recall of Evidence about CriminalBehavior, 9 J. RES.
PERSONALITY 147 (1975); Casper, Benedict & Kelly, Cognitions, Attitudes, and Decision Making in Search
and Seizure Cases, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 93 (1988); Casper, Benedict & Perry,JurorDecision
Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1989); Thompson, Cowan,
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deliberations frequently involves negotiating and reconciling the different
stories developed by different jurors.
Another implication of the story model is that because the various pieces
of evidence are developed into a coherent scenario, they are interdependent:
A change in the meaning or weight in one piece will likely effect changes in
others. This process may be best illustrated by reference to a study by
Saunders, Vidmar, and Hewitt that examined the effects of a discredited
eyewitness. 79 In a simulation experiment, the jurors heard evidence about a
breaking and entering case in which some circumstantial evidence linked the
defendant to the crime. In one condition, there was only the circumstantial
evidence, but in another there was also an eyewitness. Two other conditions
in the experiment also contained an eyewitness, whose identification was
subsequently discredited. The jurors' deliberations in reaching a verdict were
recorded and subsequently analyzed. The analysis quantified the time and
weight given to both the circumstantial evidence and the eyewitness. One
important finding for our present purposes is that when an eyewitness
identified the defendant, the jury gave greater weight to the circumstantial
evidence than when there was only circumstantial evidence. Another is that
although the weight given to the eyewitness' evidence decreased significantly
when her identification was discredited, the weight accorded the
circumstantial evidence as a result of the eyewitness remained high. This
interdependence of evidence has also been demonstrated in other studies.8 0
This view of the jury decisionmaking process has several important
implications for projections of the potential impact of social framework
evidence on the jury. First, the jurors' beliefs and attitudes will influence the
way other trial evidence is evaluated and integrated into the stories they
construct. Second, expert testimony about social frameworks, to the extent
that it adds new information or corrects misinformation, will change the
jurors' stories. Third, the expert evidence is likely to have spillover effects on
other evidence. Thus, it should not be too surprising if social framework
evidence pertaining to one trial witness has some effects on judgments about
that witness' character or on evaluations of other witnesses or evidence at
trial.

IV
RESEARCH ON THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL FRAMEWORK EVIDENCE

A.

Battered Woman Syndrome

The battered woman syndrome is a descriptive term that refers to a cluster
of typical behaviors and emotional reactions that may develop in a woman
Ellsworth & Harrington, Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Translation of Attitudes into
Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95 (1984).
79. Saunders, Vidmar & Hewitt, supra note 65.
80. Casper, Benedict & Kelly, supra note 78; Casper, Benedict & Perry, supra note 78; Hans &
Doob, supra note 68.
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repeatedly subjected to mental and physical abuse by a male with whom she is
intimately involved. 8 1 Described initially by Dr. Lenore Walker, the syndrome
has two components. 82 The key component involves what Walker refers to as
a "cycle of violence." 8 3 She posits that abusive relationships develop a
patterned, repetitive cycle. There is an escalation of tension involving
"minor" abuses-name-calling and other forms of verbal aggressiontypically accompanied by the woman's attempts to placate the batterer. In a
second phase, the tension erupts, the male becomes increasingly more
aggressive, and an acute battering incident occurs. In a third phase, the
batterer shows remorse, attempts to assist his victim, shows kindness, and
promises change. The abuse, however, recurs; and the cycle may repeat itself
many times in the relationship.
A second component of the syndrome involves the theory of "learned
helplessness."8 3 As a consequence of the abuse, the woman develops feelings
and perceptions that she has no control over her environment and no ability
to escape from the relationship. The feeling persists as a general state even
when the abuser may not be immediately threatening her. At some point, the
woman may break out of this pattern of behavior and attack the batterer,
perhaps seriously injuring or even killing him. In some instances, the attack
may occur during the battering incident, but alternatively it may occur under
circumstances in which the abuser is posing no immediate physical threat to
her-for example, while the batterer is sleeping.
If the woman faces criminal charges arising from her actions, she may
plead self-defense. This defense can be problematic because experts on
battered women contend that the general public believes certain myths about
battered women: If a woman is suffering she can simply leave her abuser;
battered women derive pleasure from their beatings; battered women are at
least partially deserving of the beatings; violent relationships are largely
confined to persons who are on the low end of the socioeconomic continuum;
and a woman waives her rights when she remains with the batterer.
At trial, the defendant may call an expert on the battered woman
syndrome in an attempt to corroborate her claim that she believed herself to
be in imminent danger even though the batterer may not have been actually
physically threatening her at the time of the incident. 8 5 There are several
81.

See C.

EWING,

supra note 6; L.

WALKER,

supra note 6; L.

WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN

(1979).

82. L.
83.

WALKER, supra note 6.
L. WALKER, supra note 81, at 55.

84. Id. at 43.
85. For commentary on the battered woman syndrome as evidence as well as the citations to
cases, see C. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAW
(1989); Thyfault, Browne & Walker, When Battered Women Kill. Evaluation and Expert Witness Testimony
Techniques, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF FAMILY
VIOLENCE (D. Sonkin ed. 1987); Acker & Toch, supra note 33; Schneider, Describing and Changing:
IWomen's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195
(1986); Thyfault, Self Defense: Battered loman Syndrome on Trial, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 485 (1984); Note,
supra note 6, at 619; Note, Discerning justice When Battered Women Kill, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 207 (1987).
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reasons for calling the expert testimony. 8 6 It will provide the jurors with
information that "battered women" form an identifiable class of persons. It
will serve to dispel misconceptions jurors may have about the effects of

spousal abuse-for example, that a battered woman is free to leave at any
time, or that she is a masochist and enjoyed the battering-thereby making
more credible the woman's own testimony about the effects of past abuse.
Finally, expert testimony will provide the jurors with a framework for
understanding why the woman would have perceived herself to be threatened
with imminent harm at the time of her actions, thereby helping to illuminate
her mental state.
Courts have differed in their approach to the admissibility of testimony
about battered woman syndrome. Some have ruled it admissible on the
grounds that it could supply the jurors with an interpretation of the facts that
might differ from those of the ordinary layperson. 8 7 Others, however, have
ruled it inadmissible because of concerns about its scientific status, the extent
to which the evidence is beyond the knowledge of the jurors, or its potential
prejudicial impact.8 8 There is limited empirical evidence bearing on each of
these issues.
Although the scientific status of the battered woman syndrome is
controversial,8 9 recent research indicates that some consensus exists among
experts about the causes and effects of spousal abuse. Dodge and Greene
constructed an eighteen-item questionnaire and surveyed forty-five
professionals who had published research on spouse abuse.9 0 The data
showed substantial agreement among the experts with respect to the majority
of the items on the questionnaire. 9 1 Thus, by this empirical measure the
86. See, e.g., Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. App. 1979); see also generally
citations, supra note 85.
87. Ibn-Tamas, 407 A.2d at 634; State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v. Kelly, 97 NJ.
178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984).
88. E.g., State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 NE.2d 137 (1981); Burhle v. State, 627 P.2d
1374 (Wyo. 1981).
89. The conceptual bases underlying the syndrome have been challenged as significantly flawed.
See particularly Note, supra note 6; see also Ibn-Tamas, 455 A.2d at 894-95.
90. M. Dodge & E. Greene, Assessing Jurors Conceptions and Misconceptions of Battered
Women (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
Items in the questionnaire tapped aspects of spousal abuse for which there appeared to be
general consensus among experts in the field (for example, the woman's sense of blame, anxiety, low
self-esteem, belief that her partner might kill her, sense of helplessness to stop the beatings, etc.). In
addition, one item was designed to assess a concern typically raised by the courts in these cases,
namely that the woman could not have been suffering severely or else she would have left the
relationship.
To select their sample, Dodge and Greene identified 73 researchers who had published in the
area of spouse abuse; 45 responded to the survey, for a response rate of 62%. Id. at 12.
91. In the survey, respondents read a brief description of a relationship involving domestic
abuse and were asked to indicate the extent to which statements applied to the setting. The 14 items
on which there was agreement included whether a woman in the described situation would believe
her husband might kill her; would feel dependent on the husband; would feel a constant potential
threat; would be persuaded to stay by promises never to be hurt again; would show anxiety and
depression; would blame herself; would believe deadly force is the only alternative; would feel
helpless; would deliberately provoke violence; would believe leaving would result in futher harm; and
could predict violence. Id. at 15.
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battered woman syndrome appears to have gained some degree of scientific
acceptance.
The next issue is whether this body of knowledge is generally familiar to
laypersons or whether they in fact hold beliefs that are contrary to the
findings. Dodge and Greene administered the same questionnaire used in
their survey of experts to prospective jurors. 9 2 This second survey permitted
a direct comparison between lay and expert knowledge. Statistically
significant differences between the laypersons and experts were found on
twelve of the eighteen items. 93 Greene, Raitz, and Lindblad administered a
twelve-question survey to approximately 300 prospective jurors. Thosejurors
were relatively knowledgeable on aspects of spousal abuse, with less than 20
percent of the prospective jurors scoring in the opposite direction of the
experts' responses on most items. 94 There were also some gender and age
effects among the laypersons: The beliefs of males and of older persons
diverged more sharply from those of the experts than did the beliefs of
females and of younger persons. 95 The researchers also found that jurors'
beliefs about the psychology of spousal violence differed as a function of the
socioeconomic status of the couple described in the question. Jurors agreed
more with the research conclusions if they were made in reference to a woman
of low socioeconomic status. 96 Greene and her colleagues concluded that
jurors may evaluate the actions of a battered woman in light of their
stereotyped attitudes about spousal violence.
For a recent doctoral dissertation, the second author of this article also
obtained data concerning beliefs about battered women. 9 7 Like Greene,
Raitz, and Linblad, she devised a set of scales to measure the extent to which
people endorse various beliefs about battered women. At present, the scale
has been tested only with samples of college students; but the results are
92. Id. at 20.
93. Id.at 13.
94. Greene, Raitz & Linbladjurors' Knowledge of Battered Women, 4 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 105, 115,
Table III (1989).
95. M. Dodge & E. Greene, supra note 90, at 16; see also Ewing & Aubrey, Battered Women and
Public Opinion: Some Realities about the Myths, 2 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 257, 262 (1987) (finding greater
endorsements of what some researchers have labelled "myths" about battered women. Their data
reveal differential myth acceptance depending on the respondent's gender.); Gentemann, Wi"fe
Beating: Attitudes of a N'on-Clinical Population, 9 VICTIMOLOGY 109 (1984); Greenblat, "Don't Hit Your
lWife. . . Unless... -: PreliminaryFindings on Normative Sup-port for the Use of Physical Force by Husbands, 10
VICTIMOLOG 221 (1985); Greene, Raitz & Lindblad, supra note 94, at 115-16, Table 4; Saunders,
Lynch, Grayson & Linz, The Inventory of Beliefs about Wife Beating: The Construction and Initial Validation of
a Measure of Beliefs and Attitudes, 2 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 39 (1987).
96. Greene and her colleagues found that if a statement referred to a woman of low
socioeconomic status, in contrast to high, jurors were more likely to believe that the woman "would
believe that she is helpless to stop the beatings," "would show signs of extreme anxiety and
depression," "would stay with her husband because she feels dependent on him," and that "once
violence is used in a relationship, it is always there as a potential threat." Greene, Raitz & Lindblad,
supra note 94, at 118.
97. R. Schuller, The Impact of Expert Testimony Pertaining to The "Battered Woman
Syndrome" on Jurors' Information Processing and Decisions (1990) (unpublished doctoral
dissertation, University of Western Ontario).
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strikingly similar to those of Greene and her colleagues. 98 Moreover, males
were more likely than females to subscribe to beliefs that are contrary to the
literature on the dynamics involved in physically abusive relationships.
Thus, several studies on beliefs about the social and psychological
contexts in which battered women exist suggest that the average juror may
have an understanding on some issues that varies from conclusions of experts
who have studied the phenomenon. However, it appears that jurors may be
better informed than critics have suggested. 9 9 Thus, while there are grounds
for concluding that jurors might be helped by expert testimony on the
battered woman syndrome, the data are not overwhelming.
Several studies have addressed the question of how jurors use battered
woman syndrome testimony in their decisionmaking. Ewing reviewed fortyfour cases in which a woman charged with homicide attempted to present
expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome. 0 0 In eighteen trials the
testimony was excluded, and in each instance the accused was convicted. In
contrast, in the remaining twenty-six cases in which the testimony was
admitted, only one-third of the defendants were acquitted. This finding
suggests that admitting battered woman syndrome testimony did not
automatically result in acquittals. In a portion of the cases in which the expert
testimony was allowed, however, the defendants were convicted of lesser
included offenses. From verdicts alone, however, we cannot be sure whether
the expert evidence caused the jurors to fail to convict on the main charge or
whether other considerations shaped the decisions. After all, the verdicts
were reached in different cases with different fact patterns.
Schuller conducted two experiments to explore the effects of battered
woman syndrome evidence.' 0 ' In the first study, mock jurors, who did not
deliberate before rendering verdicts, read a detailed transcript in which a
battered woman who killed her husband claimed self-defense. Two
presentational forms of the testimony were compared. In one condition, the
jurors read expert testimony in which only the general research pertaining to
the battered woman syndrome was presented (general condition). In the
second condition the expert testimony also included an opinion indicating
that the defendant fit the description of the syndrome (specific condition). A
third group of jurors was presented with the identical trial material, but was
not exposed to any expert testimony (control condition). The jurors were
then required to render a verdict from among three verdict alternatives:
guilty of second-degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, or not guilty by
reason of self-defense. They also answered a number of questions about
various aspects of the trial testimony.
The study found that the testimony affected verdicts, but only in the
specific condition where the connection between the expert's testimony
98.
99.
100.
101.

Compare id. at Table 2.5 with Table 3.9.
M. Dodge & E. Greene, supra note 90, draw a similar conclusion.
C. EWING, supra note 6.
R. Schuller, supra note 97.
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regarding the description of battered woman syndrome and the defendant
was explicitly drawn. The effect was to shift verdicts away from second-degree
murder. Insight into the way in which the specific expert testimony influenced
decisions was gleaned from the jurors' ratings of various aspects of the trial.
For example, they were asked to describe the pieces of evidence that they felt
most influenced their verdicts. There were clear differences in the type of
testimony cited. Jurors who were not exposed to expert testimony cited
considerably more evidence unfavorable to the defendant's case than jurors
who were provided expert testimony. Moreover, those presented with expert
testimony accompanied by an opinion linking the battered woman syndrome
to the defendant cited far fewer pieces of evidence that were unfavorable to
her (for example, the conflicting testimony of another witness). Findings on
other measures indicated that the specific form of expert testimony also led to
differential perceptions of the defendant's ability to leave and escape the
situation, the extent to which the defendant may have feared that her life was
in danger, and the extent to which the defendant intended to kill her husband.
In short, these jurors tended to believe that the defendant's "story" of selfdefense was more plausible.
Schuller's second experiment also had general, specific, and no-expert
conditions, but the study additionally examined group deliberations. The
trial transcript used in the first study was presented to the jurors in the form
of an audiotape with different actors playing the parts of witnesses, lawyers,
and the judge. The jurors deliberated in groups of four or five persons to
reach a verdict, and the individual jurors were then asked questions similar to
those in the first experiment. The deliberations of the juries were taperecorded and systematically analyzed to determine how the jurors used the
battered woman syndrome testimony.
Unlike the first experiment, the second experiment found few differences
between the general and specific expert conditions; but both were only
moderately different from the control (no-expert) condition. As in the first
experiment, the effect of expert testimony was to shift verdicts away from
second-degree murder; however, the shift was to a verdict of guilty of the
lesser included offense of manslaughter rather than to not guilty.
Examination of the deliberations indicated that the effect of the expert
testimony was to cause the jurors to attend more carefully to testimony
favorable to the defendant, suggesting that the defendant was abused, that
she feared for her life, and that she had experienced a loss of control over her
actions. In addition, the jury tended to treat less favorably the testimony of a
witness whose testimony contradicted part of the defendant's version of the
events. Thejury devoted very little deliberation time to explicit consideration
of the expert testimony; to the extent that such deliberation did occur, it came
when points of contention arose and was used to back up interpretations
favorable to the defendant's position. The jury spent little time discussing
matters pertaining to the defendant's character.
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In neither of the experiments was there evidence that the expert testimony
affected jurors' interpretation and understanding of the law. However,
individual juror assessments in the second experiment, which also obtained
some general measures of the defendant's character and credibility, showed
that the expert testimony did cause them to evaluate her character more
favorably. The effect was very modest, however.
Finally, in Schuller's first study, the more the individual jurors endorsed
what some experts consider to be "myths" about abused women, the less
likely they were to render a not guilty verdict. Moreover, in both studies
males not only were more likely to endorse these myths than females, but they
were also more likely to favor guilty verdicts and to offer unfavorable
interpretations of the defendant's state of mind and of her ability to leave the
situation in which she found herself.
We uncovered one additional simulation study that attempted to examine
0 2
the effects of battered woman syndrome testimony on juror decisions.
Unfortunately, the study is plagued by a number of methodological problems;
some of the results, however, seem consistent with those reported by
Schuller. For jurors who reported that they believed the expert, there was an
associated leniency in verdicts.
In summary, the research data indicate that potential jurors may hold
beliefs and attitudes about abused women at variance with the views of
experts who have studied or had experience with abused women. In
particular, males are likely to be skeptical about the fear the woman feels in an
abusive relationship and about her inability to leave a setting in which abuse is
threatened. These beliefs influence the way jurors interpret evidence about
the defendant's state of mind. The introduction of expert testimony
regarding the battered woman syndrome appears to have a salutary effect on
the more prejudicial beliefs, but the primary effect seems to be to shift jurors
toward the lesser included offense of manslaughter rather than toward a
verdict of not guilty, although for some circumstances the effect could be a
choice of not guilty by reason of self-defense.
While confirmatory research is needed, the data also suggest that expert
testimony causes the jurors to give more attention to the social and
psychological context within which the defendant claimed to be afraid and
helpless, 0 3 rather than causing them to reinterpret her character or
102. Follingstad, Polek, Hause, Deaton, Bulger & Conway, Factors Predicting Verdicts in Cases Where
Battered Women Kill Their Husbands, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 253 (1989).
103. This finding is consistent with recent concerns that legal scholars have raised about the
testimony. Schneider, supra note 85, for instance, has argued that battered woman syndrome
testimony fails to provide an adequate explanation for the reasonableness of the defendant's actions.
She suggests that although the term "battered woman syndrome" is used only descriptively, the
content of the testimony and the
import of the term carry a different meaning ....
The notion of battered woman syndrome contains the seeds of old stereotypes of women
in new form-the victimized and the passive battered woman, too paralyzed to act because
of her own incapacity .... It is in tension with the notion of reasonableness necessary to
self-defense since it emphasizes the woman's defects and incapacity.
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misinterpret the law. The two studies conducted by Schuller raise questions
about the impact of the form of the expert testimony. In her first experiment,

which examined only individual juror responses, only specific expert
testimony that provided general information about battered woman syndrome
and specifically identified the defendant as probably belonging to that class
seemed to have an impact on the jurors. However, in her second experiment,
where jurors deliberated as a group, the general testimony condition was as
efficacious as the specific condition in affecting interpretation of the evidence.
B.

Rape Trauma Syndrome Evidence

Rape trauma syndrome is a form of post-traumatic stress disorder used to
describe an identifiable cluster of physical, behavioral, and psychological
symptoms that may result when a woman is sexually assaulted. 0 4 Expert
testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome has been tendered for a number
of purposes, but its most common use has been in rape trials where the
defendant concedes that sexual intercourse occurred but asserts that the
complainant consented.' 0 5 The prosecution tenders the evidence to
demonstrate that the complainant's emotional state and her behavior
following the incident were consistent with the behavior of typical rape
victims. Thus, the jury is provided with information that may help in the
evaluations of the complainant's testimony.
Courts in various jurisdictions have reached conflicting conclusions about
the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome evidence.' 0 6 Some of the
disagreement concerns whether jurors are adequately knowledgeable about
the circumstances of rape and the responses of rape victims. Other
disagreement centers on the potential prejudicial impact of the testimony.
When the testimony has been held admissible, some courts have ruled that
the expert may only testify about the general characteristics of rape victims
without specific reference to the complainant because such references would
speak too closely to the ultimate issue. In contrast, other courts have allowed
testimony that the complainant exhibited symptoms consistent with a
diagnosis of rape trauma. Research studies have addressed many of the issues
raised by the courts.
Frazier and Borgida conducted an empirical study directed specifically to
the question of the degree of lay knowledge about rape. 0 7 After reviewing
Id. at 207, 216.
104. See citations, supra note 7.
105. See Graham, Rape Trauma Syndrome: Is It Probativeof Lack of Consent?, 13 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY
REV. 25 (1989); McCord, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony Regarding Rape Trauma Syndrome in Rape
Prosecutions, 26 B.C.L. REV. 1143, 1144, 1212 (1985); Ross, The Overlooked Expert in Rape Prosecutions,
14 U. TOL. L. REV. 707 (1983); Note, Checking the Allure of IncreasedConviction Rates: The Admissibility of
Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 VA. L. REV. 1657, 1689-91 (1984).
For other uses of rape trauma syndrome in litigation, seeJ. MONAHAN & L. WALKER, supra note 7, at
245-257, 326, 357.
106. See generally citations, supra note 105.
107. Frazier & Borgida, juror Common Understanding and the Admissibility of Rape Trauma Syndrome
Evidence in Court, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 101 (1988).
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research on rape, Frazier and Borgida developed a Sexual Assault
Questionnaire (SAQ) that contained eighteen questions pertaining to the
circumstances of rape and its effects on the victims (for example, victim
hesitancy to report the assault, or the degree of the trauma). The
questionnaire was administered to two groups of experts on rape; the first
were authors of empirical studies on rape and the second a group including
social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, nurses, members of the clergy,
and counsellors who had attended a meeting of the Society for Traumatic
Stress Studies. An additional questionnaire assessed the experts' opinions
about the scientific status of the data base related to rape trauma and its
potential helpfulness to jurors.
Both expert groups showed high agreement with the statements that rape
trauma syndrome is a form of post-traumatic stress disorder, that responses to
rape are distinguishable from pre-existing psychological problems of rape
victims, and that the adequacy of the existing scientific data base on rape
would not dissuade them from testifying as experts in a rape trial. However,
while the experts who had published studies on rape showed modest
agreement with the proposition that "a coherent and internally consistent
body of knowledge on the aftereffects of rape exists," l0 8 the experts from the
Society for Traumatic Stress Studies showed modest disagreement. On the
SAQ, the experts on rape averaged 84 percent correct answers regarding
empirical findings about rape, and the post-traumatic stress disorder experts
averaged 74 percent accuracy;' 0 9 but these differences were not statistically
significant. More importantly, on many of the eighteen items both groups
showed very high accuracy rates. 1'0 Thus, while there were some reservations
and disagreements regarding the scientific coherence of the body of
knowledge on rape and its aftereffects, the expressed willingness to testify and
the generally high rates of knowledge and agreement about specific scientific
findings suggests that rape trauma syndrome would likely pass muster as
having gained general acceptance in the field.
The important question, then, is how knowledgeable nonexperts were in
comparison to experts. To address this issue, the researchers also
administered the SAQ to two groups of laypersons, college students enrolled
in an introductory psychology course and nonacademic employees of a state
university. The student sample scored 58 percent correct answers on the
SAQ, and the university employees scored 57 percent.Ii The differences
between the nonexpert and expert groups were statistically significant. When
we turn to individual items on the SAQ, the nonexperts, in comparison to the
experts, appeared informed on matters such as the frequency of acquaintance
rape, the fact that victims often do not report rapes, the amount of time it
takes to recover from an assault, and the effects of prior stress upon recovery.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id at

112, Table 2.
112.
113, Table 3.
112.
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The nonexperts, however, appeared to be less well informed regarding such
matters as who is likely to be raped, the frequency of multiple victimization
experiences, the behavioral changes following a rape, and whether anger is
the most common initial reaction to being raped. The nonexperts also
seemed to endorse views that delays in reporting a rape raise suspicions about

the veracity of the claim and that there are more false reports of rapes than of
other crimes.
On the whole, then, the Frazier and Borgida study suggests that there may
be a number of areas where jurors could be helped by expert evidence,
though on some matters they appear to have adequate knowledge. While
Frazier and Borgida's study directly compared groups of nonexperts to
experts, other research also tends to support the view that the average juror
may have inadequate information about rape or may hold attitudes that would
predispose him or her to be skeptical of complainant testimony in a trial
involving a consent defense. In a random sample of 598 adults, Burt found
high levels of endorsement of rape myths. 1 2 Moreover, the more that people
endorsed the myths, the less likely they were to consider a sexual assault
committed on an acquaintance to be rape. Similarly, Feild studied 896 adult
citizens and found that their pre-existing attitudes affected how they viewed
the circumstances surrounding various allegations of rape.' 13 Another study
by Feild showed attitudinal and knowledge differences between rape
counsellors and laypersons.' 1 4 Taken as a whole, these studies and others" l5
support the view that jurors may not be adequately informed about certain
aspects of the social and psychological context in which acquaintance rape
occurs and, further, that the absence of this information may cause jurors to
be skeptical of a complainant's version of the events.
Brekke and Borgida conducted a series of simulation studies that
examined the utilization of rape trauma syndrome testimony under several
different conditions of presentation.' 16 In all of the studies, the mock jurors
heard an audiotaped version of a trial in which the defendant was charged
with third-degree sexual misconduct for allegedly forcing a female
112. Burt, CulturalMyths and Supports for Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 217 (1980);
see also Burt & Albin, Rape Myths, Rape Definitions, and Probability of Conviction, 11 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY

212 (1981).

113. Feild, juror Background Characteristicsand Attitudes Toward Rape: Correlates ofJurors' Decisions in
Rape Trials, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 73 (1978); Feild, Rape Trials and Jurors' Decisions: A PsYcholegal
Analysis of the Effects of Victim, Defendant and Case Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261 (1979).
114. Feild, Attitudes Toward Rape: A Comparative Analysis of Police, Rapists, Crisis Counselors, and
Citizens, 36J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 156 (1978).
115. See, e.g., Borgida & White, Social Perception of Rape Victims: The Impact of Legal Reform, 2 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 339 (1978); Heilbrun, Presumed Motive in the Male and Female Perception of Rape, 7 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 257 (1980); Kaplan & Miller, Effects of Jurors' Identification with the Victim Depend on
Likelihood of Victimization, 2 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 353 (1978); Luginbuhl & Mullin, Rape and
Responsibility: How Much is the Victim Blamed?, 7 SEX ROLES 547 (1981). See also Borgida & Brekke,
Psycholegal Research on Rape Trials, in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK (A. Burgess
ed. 1985); Tetreault, Rape Myth Acceptance: A Casefor ProvidingEducationalExpert Testimony in RapeJury
Trials, 7 BEHAVIORAL SCI. AND THE LAW 243 (1989).
116. Brekke & Borgida, Expert Psychological Testimony in Rape Trials: A Social-Cognitive Analysis, 55 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 372 (1988).
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complainant to have sexual intercourse. Both parties had been acquainted
prior to the incident, and both agreed that sexual intercourse had occurred.
The issue at trial was consent.
In the first study, four conditions were compared to a control condition
involving no expert testimony. In a "standard expert" condition, a
psychiatrist testified about sexual assault, attempting to focus particularly on
misconceptions about rape. In a "specific hypothetical" condition the expert
provided the same testimony, but the prosecutor also posed a legally
permissible hypothetical example to the expert, thus allowing the expert to
link the general testimony to the evidence regarding the complainant's
specific behavior. In both the standard and the hypothetical conditions, the
expert's testimony came either at the beginning of the prosecution's evidence
or at the end. Although the jurors deliberated on the trial evidence, the focus
of this first study was individual juror decisions.
With respect to verdicts, the specific hypothetical expert condition
produced a significantly greater number of convictions than the control group
condition. The standard expert condition produced a greater proportion of
guilty verdicts than the control condition; but the differences were not
statistically significant, suggesting that its effect on the jurors was weaker than
the specific hypothetical condition. Moreover, other data suggested that the
effects of the specific hypothetical expert condition were most pronounced
when the testimony was given at the beginning of the prosecution's case than
at the end.
The researchers also assessed the perceptions of the jurors regarding
various aspects of the evidence and the expert. In the specific hypothetical
condition, in comparison to the control condition, the jurors were less likely
to believe that the complainant consented or that she was responsible for the
incident. The jurors in this condition also rated her as having greater
credibility and viewed her moral character more favorably. Another finding
was that males were less favorably disposed toward the complainant than
females, assigning more responsibility to her and believing it more likely that
she consented. On the other hand, there were no gender differences
regarding the perception of the complainant's moral character.' i
Brekke and Borgida conducted additional analyses to attempt to
determine how the jurors actually used the expert testimony.' 18 The taped
deliberations of the jurors were examined to answer two sets of questions.
The first set concerned discussion of the expert testimony itself, while the
second set involved jurors' discussion of other issues in the trial. Not
surprisingly, the data showed that the expert testimony was used to support
arguments in favor of conviction. Juries exposed to the more specific
117. In their second study, Brekke and Borgida created a,"concrete" expert condition in which
the expert testimony was interspersed with very specific examples intended to link the scientific
evidence even more directly with the complainant. The concrete expert evidence had a greater
impact on verdicts and perceptions of the complainant than did the more abstract evidence. Id.
118. Id.
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hypothetical expert evidence, particularly when it came first in the
prosecution's case, were more likely to discuss its helpfulness for
understanding the other evidence. Overall, however, direct discussion of the
expert testimony was brief and limited. With respect to the discussion of
other evidence, the findings showed that in comparison to the no-expert
control condition, discussion centering around the complainant's credibility
was more frequent in all of the expert conditions. Furthermore, in the control
condition discussion of the issue of the complainant's resistance was tinged
with more prodefendant interpretations.
Another study conducted by Brekke examined the impact of expert
testimony on rape trauma syndrome evidence that was challenged by an
opposing expert, thus addressing the "battle of experts" issue., 19 The study
consisted of three conditions: a single-expert condition in which the expert
described general research on rape trauma syndrome and provided an
opinion that the complainant exhibited characteristics consistent with rape
trauma syndrome; a two-expert condition in which an opposing expert for the
defendant testified about problems with the methodology and premises
underlying rape trauma syndrome research (the opposing expert did not
directly address the specific opinion offered by the prosecution's expert); and
20
a control condition in which no expert testimony was presented.'
In comparison to the no-expert control condition, the expert conditions
resulted in moderately small but significant effects on juror's predeliberation
verdicts and judgments about evidence. Following deliberations, jurors in the
expert testimony conditions reported that the complainant was more credible
and had a better moral character, and that she was less responsible for the
assault than did jurors in the no-expert control condition. They also indicated
that it was more likely that the defendant had committed the rape; as a result,
they rendered significantly more verdicts of guilty and recommended harsher
sentences than jurors in the no-expert control condition.
Jurors who heard the expert testimony also reported that they gave greater
consideration to the issue of the defendant's credibility and to the issue of
force. These expert testimony effects, however, occurred primarily when the
prosecution expert's testimony was not contested by an opposing defense
expert. On all measures except evaluation of the complainant's moral
character, the opposing expert condition did not differ from the no-expert
119. N. Brekke, Expert Scientific Testimony in Rape Trials 27, 31-32 (1985) (unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University of Minn.).
120. The study also included two additional conditions to examine the impact of another form of
expert testimony, namely polygraph evidence. Paralleling the conditions for rape trauma syndrome
evidence, in one condition the expert described polygraph techniques and research as well as
providing an opinion that the complainant passed a polygraph test, while in the other condition an
additional expert was called by the defense to rebut the prosecution's expert. The opposing expert's
testimony focused on the problems associated with polygraph tests and not on the specific results of
the test administered to the complainant. Few differences for the two types of testimony were found;
that is, the results tended to parallel those found with respect to the rape trauma syndrome evidence
conditions. Id. at 32, 39 at Table 1.
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control condition, thus suggesting that the influence of the prosecution's
expert witness was negated by the testimony of the opposing expert.
In summary, the research findings suggest that potential jurors may harbor
conceptions about rape and its aftereffects that differ from those held by
persons considered to be expert in the field of sexual assault. Laypersons'
beliefs influence how they view a complainant's version of events surrounding
an alleged rape. Males tend to view complainants less favorably than do
females. The experimental studies of the effect of expert testimony on juror
verdicts indicated that it produced a greater proportion of guilty verdicts than
did no-expert control conditions. Expert testimony called jurors' attention to
situational evidence, increased their discussion of the complainant's
credibility, and subsequently decreased their beliefs that the complainant
consented or that she was responsible for the incident. The testimony also
produced some spillover effects, causing jurors to rate the complainant as
having greater credibility and better moral character. The research also
suggested that the effects of expert testimony were stronger when the expert
made direct links from general findings about rape victims to the complainant
and when the testimony came early in the trial. One experiment indicated
that challvnge by an opposing expert reduced the influence of the first expert.
C.

Eyewitness Reliability

Expert testimony bearing on potential eyewitness unreliability constitutes
the third area of social framework evidence under research investigation.
Psychologists have devoted more scholarly effort to the examination of factors
influencing eyewitness identification than to any other area of law. For the
past two decades this has been the high-profile area of social framework
evidence, generating controversy within the field of psychology itself and
evoking concerns in the legal community.' 2' While this subject receives
detailed treatment in the article by Penrod and Cutler, 2 2 we will summarize
some of the findings here in our attempt to discover parallels with juror
responses to battered woman syndrome and rape trauma syndrome evidence.
The concerns about expert evidence on eyewitness reliability are identical
to those raised by the two other subjects. First, is there a body of knowledge
about the factors influencing eyewitness identification, and can it be
generalized to the legal setting? Second, to the extent that a body of
knowledge does exist, can it help the jurors? Third, is the impact of expert
testimony likely to be more prejudicial than probative?
A recent survey by Kassin, Ellsworth, and Smith asked sixty-three experts
located in the United States, Canada, and Europe about the reliability of
scientific data bearing on twenty-one factors associated with eyewitness
identification. 23 At least 80 percent of the experts agreed that research
121. For a review of the issues and controversy, see generally 10 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 1 (1986).
122. Penrod & Cutler, supra note 4.
123. Kassin, Ellsworth & Smith, The "General Acceptance" of Psychological Research on Eyewitness
Testimony: A Survey of Experts, 44 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 1089 (1989).
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showed that eyewitnesses can be influenced by the following factors: the
wording of questions, line-up instructions, misleading post-event information,
attitudes and expectations, exposure time, unconscious transference, showups, and forgetting curves. They also agreed that the confidence of an
eyewitness is often spuriously associated with accuracy. Over 70 percent of
the experts also agreed that there was a cross-race identification bias in white
witnesses, a tendency for witnesses to overestimate the duration of events,
and problems with the construction of line-ups. Over 50 percent agreed
about five other findings.' 24 If one accepts the sample of experts as
representative, 25 there are grounds for concluding that a consensus exists in
the relevant scientific community about a number of findings pertaining to
eyewitness reliability.
Other studies have attempted to determine the extent to which laypersons
hold beliefs that are inconsistent with the body of expert knowledge.
Deffenbacker and Loftus 12 6 and Yarmey and Jones 12 7 used a questionnaire
approach, asking groups of laypersons questions similar to those posed by
Kassin, Ellsworth, and Smith in their survey of experts. These studies
indicated that although laypersons held beliefs consistent with some of the
research findings, their beliefs varied substantially from the researchers'
conclusions on other issues.
Brigham and Bothwell took another approach. 2 8 They described the
conditions of experiments involving eyewitness reliability to laypersons and
asked them to predict the results. The predictions were then compared to the
results actually obtained in the experiments. On the whole, laypersons
grossly overestimated eyewitness reliability, causing Brigham and Bothwell to
infer that jurors do not intuitively give proper weight to eyewitness
identifications. Other studies have used trial simulation experiments to
discover how laypersons evaluate eyewitness evidence. In a series of
experiments, Wells and Lindsay and their colleagues 2 9 have consistently
found that jurors place a great deal of weight on the confidence with which
the witness identified the defendant, even though confidence has been shown
124. These findings were as follows: Hypnosis does not facilitate the retrieval of an eyewitness'
memory; judgments of color made under monochromatic light are not reliable; police officers are no
more accurate as eyewitnesses than the average person; the presence of a weapon impairs the ability
to identify the perpetrator's face; hypnosis does not facilitate the retrieval of an eyewitness's memory.
Id. at 1090.
125. The list of experts for the survey was compiled from a search of the eyewitness literature in
scientific journals between 1980 and mid-1986 and was supplemented by other sources. This
selection strategy resulted in a pool of 113 prospective experts, of whom 56% responded to the
survey.
126. Deffenbacher & Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common UnderstandingConcerning Eyewitness Behavior?,
6 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 15 (1982).
127. Yarmey & Jones, supra note 60.
128. Brigham & Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accurac' of Eyewitness
Identifications, 7 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 19 (1983).
129. See Human Intuition, supra note 60. For a review of the earlier work and for a recent
replication and elaboration, see Lindsay, Wells & O'Connor, Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate
Eyewitnesses: A Replication and Extension, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1989).
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not to be correlated with accuracy. 1 30 Some of the research reported in
Penrod and Cutler's article also indicates that witness confidence is a
significant component in juror judgments of credibility.131
A final set of data bearing on juror knowledge comes from the Kassin,
Ellsworth, and Smith survey of experts. In addition to asking the experts
about the reliability of various findings, Kassin, Ellsworth, and Smith also
sought their opinions about whether jurors would subscribe to the findings as
a matter of common sense.' 32 The answers indicated that the experts
believed jurors would be reasonably well informed on some issues, but that
33
they would be unaware of others.'
Taken as a whole, these sources indicate that laypersons' beliefs about the
factors that make eyewitnesses credible often do not comport with the body of
expert knowledge. It should be added, however, that on some matters lay
intuition and experience seem consistent with the research findings. Thus,
whether expert evidence might assist the jurors in a specific case will depend
upon which factors are at issue in that case.
Loftus conducted two of the first experiments intended to examine the
impact of expert testimony about potential eyewitness unreliability. 134 In the
first experiment, simulating jurors read a criminal trial transcript in which the
primary evidence against the defendant involved eyewitness identification. In
half of the trial transcripts, an expert testified about factors that might lead to
eyewitness unreliability; in the other half, there was no expert evidence. The
expert condition reduced the number of convictions. The second experiment
was similar to the first, but the jurors deliberated. In the expert condition, the
jurors spent significantly more time discussing the eyewitness testimony. A
similar study conducted by Hosch, Beck, and McIntyre also found that an
expert witness increased the amount of deliberation time devoted to
eyewitness testimony and to other relevant evidence.' 3 5 While all three of
these experiments indicated that the effect of expert evidence was to direct
attention to the eyewitness, the experiments were not analyzed in a way that
permits a conclusion about whether the effect was a desirable one. The expert
evidence may have made the simulating jurors too critical of the eyewitness.
Rather than cause the jurors to give closer scrutiny to the eyewitness
130. For a review of the literature assessing the relationship between eyewitness confidence and
accuracy, see Bothwell, Deffenbacher & Brigham, Correlation of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence:
Optimality Hypotheses Revisited, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 691 (1987).
131. Penrod & Cutler, supra note 4, at Part V.C.4. Penrod and Cutler, it should be noted, did not
find other factors having a significant influence on juror responses. Id.
132. Kassin, Ellsworth & Smith, supra note 123, at 1094.
133. The experts believed that jurors would be reasonably well informed on issues such as length
of exposure time affecting reliability, cross-racial identification, and line-up fairness; they would not
be adequately informed regarding the findings about the confidence-accuracy relationship,
overestimation of the duration of events, postevent suggestions, or unconscious inference. See id.
134. Loftus, Impact of Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 65 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 9 (1980).

135. Hosch, Beck & McIntyre, Influence of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Accuracy on jury
Decisions, 4 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 287 (1980).
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testimony, the expert evidence may have caused them to discount it
3 6
altogether. '
Wells and his colleagues have conducted experiments examining the effect
of expert evidence in a different way.' 3 7 Persons who had witnessed a staged
theft, attempted to identify the thief from a photograph line-up. The
researchers then selected both witnesses who accurately identified the thief
and those who did not. These witnesses were then examined and crossexamined in a manner similar to ordinary courtroom procedure. Videotapes
of the examinations were played for simulating jurors, who were asked to rate
the extent to which they believed the witness. Before undertaking this task,
some of the jurors saw an additional videotape in which an expert offered
cautions about witnessing conditions, such as findings about the relationships
between witness confidence and accuracy, and between the amount of detail
relayed by a witness and accuracy. In one study, the expert testimony did not
increase jurors' ability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate
witnesses, but did reduce the extent to which the jurors believed the
eyewitness. In the second study, however, jurors in the expert testimony
condition believed inaccurate witnesses significantly less often than accurate
ones. Additionally, the expert testimony induced the jurors to be sensitive to
the effects of different viewing conditions. These effects did not occur among
13 8
jurors in a no-expert control condition.
Maass, Brigham, and West conducted a simulation that varied the form in
which expert testimony was presented to the jurors.' 39 In comparison to
control group conditions the expert evidence conditions resulted in more
lenient judgments of the defendant; however, the data suggested that the
eyewitness was not entirely discounted. The study also found that when the
expert testimony was linked to the eyewitness and accompanied by causal
explanations, it had greater impact on the jurors.
Fox and Walters also studied the effects of different types of expert
testimony in a simulation trial involving eyewitness evidence. 140 In a general
testimony condition, the expert discussed general findings about perception
and memory processes, whereas in a specific testimony condition the expert
136. This observation has been made previously by Wells, supra note 60, at 88-91, and by Penrod
& Cutler, supra note 4. Penrod & Cutler refer to the legally desirable impact of the expert as a
"sensitivity" effect and to inappropriate discounting as a "skepticism" effect.
137. Wells, supra note 60; Wells, Lindsay & Tousignant, Effects of Expert Psychological Advice on Juror
judgments in Eyewitness Testimony, 4 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 275 (1980).
138. Sanders, Expert Witnesses in Eyewitness FacialIdentification Cases, TEX. TECH L. REV. 1409, 145964 (1986). Sanders has criticized the Wells, Lindsay, and Tousignant findings by suggesting that the
effect of the expert may have been to cause the jurors to discount the eyewitness too much. While his
criticism may be valid, it is blunted by a second study, performed by Wells and Wright and described
in Wells, supra note 60, which found differential effects according to witnesses and witnessing
conditions. However, Wells has pointed out some limitations of his own research, including the
artificiality of the setting, the fact that the expert was not cross-examined, and the fact that the jurors
did not deliberate. Id. at 88.
139. Maass, Brigham & West, Testifying on Eyewitness Reliability: Expert Advice is Not Always Persuasive,
15J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1985).

140.

Fox & Walters, supra note 42.
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discussed effects of twelve specific factors relevant to the case that are known
to influence eyewitness reliability. Though jurors in both expert testimony
conditions were less likely to believe the eyewitness than those in a no-expert
control condition, the specific expert testimony had a greater effect than the
general testimony.
The research by Penrod, Cutler, and Dexter that is described in
considerable detail in the Penrod and Cutler article also examined the effects
of expert testimony. 41 In a complex simulation trial, those authors varied a
number of factors, including the absence or presence of expert testimony.
The expert was rigorously cross-examined by the prosecutor. Additionally,
the form of the expert testimony was varied. In some cases, the expert
discussed only research bearing on memory processes, whereas in another
condition the expert added quantitative data involving percentages of false
and correct identifications obtained in eyewitness experiments. The
simulating jurors who saw the videotapes in the various conditions of the
experiment were asked to render verdicts and make ratings about the
defendant's guilt as well as to respond to other questions. 14 2 One important
finding of the experiment was that expert testimony increased juror sensitivity
to factors relevant to the eyewitness' ability to identify the defendant; there
was little indication that the testimony caused the jurors to discount
excessively the eyewitness testimony, or that it had significant effects on other
evidence. Another important finding was that the elaborated expert
testimony involving quantitative estimates had a greater impact than the more
general expert testimony.
Judicial commentary or instructions merit attention, as they are sometimes
offered as an alternative to expert testimony. 43 Three studies have examined
the effect of judicial instructions or commentary regarding eyewitness
reliability. These studies varied the form of instructions given to the jurors.
Katzev and Wishart presented simulating jurors with a videotaped trial in
which an eyewitness played a crucial role in identifying a defendant accused of
burglarizing a warehouse. 14 4 Before they began deliberations, the juries
heard one of three sets of instructions. In a control condition they heard
standard instructions regarding jury responsibility, types of evidence,
definition of the charge, and the burden of proof. In a second condition they
heard the same instructions accompanied by a recapitulation by the judge of
arguments that had been set forth by both prosecution and defense counsel.
The third condition contained everything in the second condition plus judicial
commentary that cautioned the jurors about eyewitness identification and
reviewed some of the psychological issues involved in such identification. The
third condition produced the greatest number of not guilty verdicts among
141. See Penrod & Cutler, supra note 4, at Parts VII, VIII.
142. The experiment obtained only the responses of individual jurors who did not have the
opportunity to deliberate.
143. See Walker & Monahan, supra note 1.
144. Katzev & Wishart, The Impact ofJudicial Commentary Concerning Eyewitness Identifications onJury
Decision Making, 76J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733 (1985).
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individual jurors. It also reduced the amount of deliberation time in
comparison to the other two conditions.
Hoffheimer 4 5 also conducted a simulation study involving eyewitness
identification in criminal trials. In addition to a control condition with general
instructions, there were two other instruction conditions. In the first, there
was an instruction that the government had to prove the defendant's identity
beyond a reasonable doubt. In the second, there was a particularized
identification instruction modeled after the instruction used in some federal
courts.'

46

Contrary to the intent of the particularized instruction, and to what

was predicted, the particularized instruction increased conviction rates.
Hoffheimer argues that the particularized instruction drew attention to factors
that would bear on eyewitness accuracy. This added attention encouraged
jurors to speculate and make inferences based on their own understanding,
47
which studies have demonstrated to be inaccurate.
Greene compared the absence or presence of judicial instructions about
eyewitnesses in two simulation experiments. 48 The first judicial instruction
had a minimal impact on jury verdicts, but the instruction did cause the jurors
to place more weight on the eyewitness testimony. In a second experiment, a
more particularized judicial instruction reduced conviction rates.
Finally, a study described by Penrod and Cutler attempted to examine
many of the issues regarding expert testimony within a single experiment.14 9
Using the basic trial stimulus materials employed in their previous studies,
Penrod, Cutler, and Dexter created six experimental conditions: a no-expert
condition; a defense-hired expert condition; an opposing expert condition; a
court-appointed expert condition; a Telfaire ' 50 -type judicial instruction
condition; and a defense expert plus judicial instruction condition. In
comparison to the control group, the opposing expert condition induced the
jurors to be sensitive to the conditions under which the eyewitness made the
identification. Interestingly, however, both the opposing expert condition
and the court-appointed expert condition caused thejurors to devalue aspects
of the eyewitness testimony inappropriately. The defense expert condition
appeared to make the jurors sensitive to eyewitness factors without undue
devaluation of the testimony. As in the previous studies by Greene and by
Hoffheimer, the Telfaire-style instruction had minimal effect.
In summary, the accumulated findings suggest that laypersons' beliefs
about eyewitness identification are often inconsistent with those held by
145. Hoflheimer, Effect of ParticularizedInstructions on Evaluation of Eyewitness Identification Evidence,
13 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REv. 43 (1989).
146. United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
147. Hoffheimer, supra note 145, at 60. Unfortunately, like so many other studies, Hofiheimer's
experiment did not require the jurors to deliberate. An analysis of those deliberations could have
provided data bearing on his intriguing speculations.
148. Greene, Judge's Instructions in Eyewitness Testimony.: Evaluation and Revision, 18 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 252 (1988); Greene, Eyewitness Testimony and the Use of Cautionary Instructions, 8 U.
BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 15 (1987).
149. Penrod & Cutler, supra note 4, at Part VIII.
150. 469 F.2d 552.
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experts in the area. On the other hand, as with the other two topics covered
in this article, jurors are fairly well informed on some matters about
eyewitness identification. Hence, the informativeness of the testimony for any
particular case depends on the unique factors surrounding the identification.
The experiments investigating the effects of the testimony on how jurors
decide cases also suggest a number of conclusions. The inclusion of expert
testimony does seem to alter aspects of the decision process. The testimony
causes jurors to discredit eyewitness evidence and to render verdicts more
favorable to the defendant. In those studies that have also included group
deliberations, some have found that the introduction of the testimony
increased deliberation time. Unfortunately, the lack of attention to the
specific content of the deliberations makes interpretation of these effects
problematic. Another finding is that the impact of expert testimony
corresponds to the degree that it is linked to the specific issues in the case.
Finally, some studies suggest that social framework evidence is likely to have
more impact on jurors when it is presented through expert testimony rather
than through judicial instructions.
D.

The "Aura of Science" and the Expert: Corroborative Evidence

There is a persistent concern expressed in judicial opinions and legal
commentary about jurors being unduly influenced by expert testimony
because of the "aura of science," or the prestige of the expert. 151 The
findings from the studies we have reviewed indicate that while jurors do use
social framework evidence they are certainly not overwhelmed by it. In light
of the serious legal concerns, however, it is informative to consider any other
findings consistent or inconsistent with these results. There are in fact a
number of field studies and simulation experiments about reactions to social
science evidence that address jurors' capacity for skepticism and critical
evaluation.
Bridgeman and Marlowe r52 conducted lengthy interviews with sixty-five
jurors who had participated in felony trials in California during 1974 and
1975. While the jurors stated that they attached considerable importance to
the testimony of other witnesses, they claimed that they were not greatly
influenced by the testimony of doctors or psychiatrists. Saks and Wissler 5 3
interviewed ninety-seven jurors and found that psychiatrists and psychologists
were deemed about as competent as eyewitnesses but less competent than
other types of medical doctors, chemical/drug experts, firearms experts, and
accountants. Rosenthal interviewed eight members of a jury in an arson case
involving voice spectrogram evidence. 154 The validity of the evidence was
challenged, with the result that the prosecution called three additional experts
151.
152.

See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
Bridgeman & Marlow,Jury Decision Making: An EmpiricalStudy Based on Actual Felony Trials, 64

J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 91 (1979).

153.

Saks & Wissler, Legal and PsychologicalBases of Expert Testimony: Surveys of the Law and ofJurors, 2

BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 435 (1984).

154.

Rosenthal, Nature ofJury Response to the Expert Witness, 28 J. FORENSIC Sci. 528 (1983).
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and the defense called seven. From interviews with eight jurors, Rosenthal
concluded that when the jurors did not comprehend much of the highly
technical discussion of spectrography, they shifted their attention to the
personal characteristics of the experts as a basis for judging the credibility of
their testimony.
In The American Juy, the classic study of criminal juries, Kalven and Zeisel
compared rates of agreement between the judge and the jury.' 55 Agreement
rates did not differ as a function of the presence or absence of experts in the
trial. Myers also attempted to assess the impact of expert witnesses in her
study of Indiana felony juries. 156 She concluded that the presence or absence
of expert witnesses was not related to conviction rates. Neither of these two
studies assessed the impact of expert testimony with much rigor, but they do
suggest that the jury is not overwhelmed by the mere presence of experts.
This suggestion is consistent with simulation studies that examine the impact
of specific types of expert evidence.
To explore jurors' responses to the insanity defense, Simon conducted a
series of elaborate trial simulations with jurors selected from jury rolls in
Chicago and St. Louis. 15 7 Analysis of the tape-recorded deliberations
indicated that jurors did not accept psychiatric evidence uncritically.
Considerable skepticism was voiced toward the testimony. Far from rubberstamping the psychiatric opinions, the jurors relied heavily on the trial record,
especially details of the circumstances in which the defendant's behavior
occurred. Simon also found that jurors made distinctions between the
psychiatrist's clinical diagnosis and the moral and legal decision that they
were required to render. Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan, and Thompson
conducted another simulation experiment to determine whether jurors'
responses to the insanity defense would differ as a function of the asserted
etiology of the defendant's mental problems.' 5 8 The research did not assess
the impact of expert testimony itself, but it did indicate that the substance of
psychiatric testimony may affect the jury's receptiveness to that testimony.
While jurors readily accepted evidence regarding mental retardation and
psychomotor epilepsy, many were likely to reject the diagnosis of
schizophrenia. The data from these studies seem consistent with nationwide
court statistics indicating that the success rates of defendants who plead not
guilty by reason of insanity is low; between 75 and 99 percent of defendants
59
who enter such pleas are found guilty.1

A number of studies have attempted to assess the impact of polygraph
testimony on jurors. Polygraph evidence, like social framework evidence,
155.
156.

H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 66.
Myers, Rule Departures and M'aking Law. Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 781

(1979).
157. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967).
158. Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan & Thompson, The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity, 8
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 81 (1984).
159. See V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 186 (1986); Note: Evaluating Michigan's Guilt)
But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 77 (1982).
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draws upon statistical data about normative responses of groups of people as
part of its underlying scientific rationale. Its reliance on sophisticated
physiological measurement devices, electronic recording equipment, and
assertions about statistical accuracy rates would seem to enhance its "aura of
science."
A 1938 study 160 involved interviews with jurors who had heard a case in
which polygraph evidence was used, and indicated that the testimony was
accorded substantial weight. But nearly four decades later, a set of
interviews' 6' with jurors who heard another case suggested that the jurors
had used the evidence only in a limited fashion, principally as corroboration
of the other evidence.
Other relevant data come from simulation experiments. Markwart and
Lynch 162 assessed the impact of polygraph evidence in a simulated felonymurder trial. A control condition containing no polygraph evidence was
contrasted both with a condition in which polygraph evidence unfavorable to
the defendant was introduced and with a condition in which the polygraph
evidence was favorable to the defendant. The trial evidence was followed by a
forty-minute videotaped instruction by a judge, who characterized polygraphs
as having a 90 percent accuracy rate but emphasized that they tended to
misidentify innocent persons as not telling the truth. The unfavorable
polygraph results produced more verdicts against the defendant than the
control condition, and the favorable polygraph results produced more
verdicts in favor of the defendant. Tape recordings of the deliberations of the
jurors, however, suggested that little time was devoted to discussion of the
polygraph evidence and that some jurors dismissed it out of hand. Postdeliberation questioning of the jurors suggested that the polygraph testimony
was rated as having less significance than the other evidence. These last two
analyses, however, are not consistent with the fact that the verdicts were
affected. One explanation is that, as found in the Saunders, Vidmar, and
Hewitt experiment described earlier,1 6 3 the polygraph evidence caused the
jurors to give more weight to the other evidence consistent with the
polygraph testimony about the truthfulness of the defendant.
Cavoukian and Heslegrave1 64 conducted two other experiments involving
polygraph evidence that tended to exonerate the defendant in a felonymurder trial. In both experiments the polygraph testimony produced higher
acquittal rates than the control conditions in which polygraph testimony was
absent. However, the study also found that a caution by a judge or by an
expert witness about the accuracy rate of polygraphs reduced the impact of
the testimony. These authors concluded that there is no evidence to support
160. Forkosch, Lie Detector and the Courts, 16 N.Y.Q REV. 202 (1939).
161. Barnett, How Does aJury View Polygraph Examination Results?, 2 POLYGRAPH 275 (1973).
162. Markwart & Lynch, The Effects of Polygraph Evidence on Mock Jury Decision Making, 7 J. POLICE
Sci. & ADMIN. 324 (1979).
163. Saunders, Vidmar & Hewitt, supra note 65.
164. Cavoukian & Heslegrave, The Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in Court, 4 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
117 (1980).
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the hypothesis that jurors will blindly accept polygraph evidence, at least not
when they are cautioned about the potential unreliability of the instrument.
Loftus conducted a simulation experiment to determine the relative
weight jurors would give to scientific evidence in comparison to testimony by
an eyewitness.' 65 The stimulus case involved charges of passing a bad check.
In the control condition, an eyewitness identified the defendant as the person
who had passed the bad check. In a second condition, expert polygraph
evidence incriminated the defendant. A third condition involved expert
evidence that the fingerprints on the check matched those of the defendant;
and a fourth condition involved expert evidence that the handwriting on the
check matched that of the defendant. The rates of conviction in the four
conditions were as follows: eyewitness, 78 percent; polygraph, 53 percent;
fingerprints, 70 percent, and handwriting, 34 percent. Thus, while the impact
of the expert on verdicts varied between expert conditions, none was as
influential as the layperson witness.
Greene, Wilson, and Loftus studied the impact of hypnotically refreshed
testimony on jury decisionmaking.' 66 Some courts exclude such testimony,
others admit it under limited conditions, while still others have ruled it
admissible, reasoning that the jury can decide how much weight it should be
accorded. Some of the reservations about admissibility stem from the belief
that, since the jurors have no experience in assessing the potential
unreliability of the body of science on hypnosis, they will view it as having
mystic infallibility, and that they will therefore give hypnotically refreshed
testimony undue weight. To examine these assertions, Greene, Wilson, and
Loftus conducted simulation studies with prospective jurors and with college
students. The jurors watched a ninety-minute videotape of a trial involving a
stabbing incident, answered a predeliberation questionnaire, and finally
deliberated in groups to reach a verdict. In one of three conditions, an
important prosecution witness provided a police officer with crucial details
immediately after the incident; in another condition, the details were not
recalled until a week later; and in a third condition, the details were recalled
only after hypnotic refreshment one week after the incident. The major
finding, derived from both the predeliberation questionnaires and from
systematic analyses of the tape-recorded deliberations, was that the jurors
viewed the hypnotically refreshed testimony with a reasonable degree of
skepticism. Additionally, the results showed that jurors upon learning that
one prosecution witness' testimony had been refreshed hypnotically, tended
to treat the testimony of all the prosecution witnesses as less credible.
Goodman conducted two simulation experiments intended to assess how
jurors respond to probabilistic evidence.i 6 7 The first involved college
165. Loftus, PsVchological Aspects of Courtroom Testimony, 347 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 27 (1980).
166. Greene, Wilson & Loftus, Impact of Hypnotic Testimony on the Jury, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 61
(1989).
167. J. Goodman,Jurors' Comprehension of Scientific Evidence (June 1988) (paper presented at
the annual meeting of the Law and Society Association, Vail, Colo.).
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students assuming the role of jurors in a murder trial in which expert
testimony about the matching of blood samples was critical to the
prosecution's case. The jurors rated the blood test evidence favorably but
accorded it lower levels of reliability than that asserted by the experts. Only
23 percent of the students found the probabilistic evidence adequate to
convict the defendant.
In Goodman's second experiment, the simulating jurors were 223 persons

eligible for jury duty (31 percent of whom had previously served as jurors).
The case involved a claim of arson, either in the context of criminal charges or
68
of a civil lawsuit in which the owner of a factory sued his insurance carrier. 1
Each side of the case called both lay and expert witnesses, supporting either a
finding of arson or a finding that the fire was acciderltal. The expert evidence
involved chromatographic tests on gasoline samples. A number of findings
from this experiment bear on the impact of expert witnesses.
First, jurors gave more weight to the testimony of one of the lay witnesses
than to either of the experts. Second, they appeared to give careful attention
to relevant factors in deciding which testimony of the conflicting experts
should be given more weight. For example, one expert had conducted an onsite inspection while the other had not. Third, the jurors assigned relatively
more weight to the probabilistic evidence when it had more probative
value.' 69 Fourth, there was no evidence that the jurors confused the burden
of proof with the probabilistic evidence. Regardless of whether the burden of
proof was beyond a reasonable doubt or balance of probability, the
proportion of findings of arson did not vary. Fifth, there was an indication
that while the expert evidence was used, it was given less weight than it should
have been accorded. The last finding is consistent with more general findings
about human decisionmaking,1 70 but is inconsistent with the hypothesis that
jurors will accord such evidence too much weight.
It is important to note that Goodman's jurors did have difficulty
understanding probabilistic evidence, particularly in converting probabilities
to percentages and vice versa. Moreover, the impact of the evidence varied
according to the form in which it was described to the jurors. Jurors were less
likely to use evidence presented in percentages than evidence presented in
probabilities. These findings are generally consistent with earlier research by

168. The purpose of these two conditions was to develop two burdens of proof, "beyond a
reasonable doubt" in the criminal trial and "balance of probabilities" in the civil trial, in order to test
the hypothesis that jurors might confuse the probabilistic evidence provided by the expert with
burdens of proof.
169. The probabilities associated with the evidence were also varied in the experiment to test
jurors' sensitivity to its incriminating value.
170. See, e.g., R. NISBE-rr & L. Ross, supra note 67; Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processingand
Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAw & Soc. REV. 123 (1981); Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
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Thompson and Schumann 17 1 and by Faigman and Baglioni.' 72 The results
bear on the ability of the jury to evaluate the validity of scientific techniques as
73
opposed to foundational evidence.1
Case studies of jurors involved in civil trials in which experts played an
important role provide some additional information. Austin interviewed
jurors from two trials arising out of an antitrust case. 174 His interviews
suggested that the jurors were quite skeptical of an economist witness,
probably as a consequence of a rigorous cross-examination. Selvin and Picus
interviewed jurors involved in a complex asbestos case.' 7 5 One of their
conclusions was that the "jurors were ...

generally skeptical if not negatively

disposed toward many of the medical experts who testified."' 176 Finally, as
part of an extensive project on medical malpractice litigation, the first author,
his colleagues, and their students have interviewed jurors who were the
factfinders in a number of medical malpractice trials.' 7 7 These trials involved
not only medical experts, but also economists and actuaries. One of the most
striking findings from these interviews is the skepticism that jurors displayed
toward experts. They were sensitive to the fact that the trial is an adversary
process; in many cases, they spontaneously indicated to interviewers that
experts are chosen to testify because their opinions favor the party that calls
them.
V
CONCLUSION

We can now return to the five areas of legal concern about social
framework evidence discussed in Part III.
A.

Providing Knowledge to the Jury

With respect to the three areas reviewed in this article- battered women,
rape victims, and eyewitnesses-empirical studies show a degree of consensus
existing among experts about each of the respective bodies of knowledge.
The studies also indicate that laypersons frequently hold beliefs or
impressions at variance with these bodies of expert knowledge. This last
171. Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials?, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 9; Thompson & Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in

Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney s Fallacy, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 167
(1983).
172. Faigman & Baglioni, Bayes' Theorem in the Trial Process: InstructingJurieson the Value of Statistical
Evidence, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1988).
173. See Imwinkelried, supra note 46, at 600-04.
174. A. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY (1985).
175. M. SELVIN & L. Picus, THE DEBATE OVER JURY PERFORMANCE (1987).
176. Id. at 27. Selvin and Picus also observed that when the testimony was complex and
confusing the jurors reported that they evaluated the witness' evidence based on their personal
impressions of that expert.
177. The Medical Malpractice Research Project was conducted with my colleagues Thomas
Metzloff and David Warren under the auspices of the Private Adjudication Center at the Duke
University School of Law. The data have not yet been reported in scholarly articles.
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conclusion must be qualified in light of the fact that within each of the areas
the data indicate that laypersons tend to be relatively better informed on
some matters than others. Additionally, on the topics of battered women and
rape victims there appear to be some gender differences, with women being
78
better informed than men.'
The potential assistance of social framework evidence for jurors depends,
of course, on the specific subject matter and the context to which it is applied.
Thus, the potential contribution of other types of social framework evidence
to jurors' knowledge will have to be assessed independently.
B.

Acceptance, Integration, and Utilization

The studies covered in our review indicate, on the whole, that laypersons
will accept social framework evidence and incorporate it into their
decisionmaking. The data do indicate that the likelihood of the evidence
being integrated into the decisionmaking process is greater when the
information conveyed by the expert is directly linked to the witness to whom it
relates and the information is conveyed in concrete terms. For example,
testimony about the responses of rape victims is more likely to be used by
jurors when it is specifically tied to the complainant in the case than when it
only describes typical rape victim behavior. This finding is not surprising in
light of a large body of recent work on human decisionmaking showing that
scientists and lawyers as well as laypersons are prone to value concrete
examples more than abstract examples or statistical evidence about base
rates. 179
178. The implications of these differences among jurors for the jury deliberation process have
not been explored in any of the existing literature, but they raise some interesting questions. An
important rationale for the jury's existence is that the perspectives and experience of the various
individual jurors will be shared during deliberations, making the collective wisdom of the jury greater
than the sum of its individual deliberators. See Forston, Sense & Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication,
1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 601; V. HANS & N. VIDMAR, supra note 159, at 47-61, 97-112. Empirical studies
have shown that this process does indeed occur, see, e.g., Dashiell, Experimental Studies of the Influence of
Social Situations in the Behavior of Individual Human Adults, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1097

(C. Murchison ed. 1935); Forston, supra note 178; ForstonJudge'sInstructions. A QuantitativeAnalysis of
Jurors' Listening Comprehension, 18 TODAY'S SPEECH 34 (1970), and is quite consistent with other
literature and theory about social influence in groups, see generally I. STEINER, GROUP PROCESS AND
PRODUCTIVITY (1972). Thus, one could hypothesize that during the deliberation process the betterinformed jurors might convey their insights to the less-informed jurors. If this hypothesis was
confirmed, it might be argued that there is no need for expert testimony. Critics of this argument,
however, could contend that the less-informed juror would resist the arguments of the betterinformed jurors and that the expert testimony will be used to bolster the arguments of the betterinformed jurors during deliberations. Additionally, those in favor of introcucing expert testimony
might point out that the data tend to show that even the best-informed jurors have knowledge levels
below those of experts, and might argue that expert testimony is, therefore, needed in any event. We
point out these possible conflicting positions as a matter to be investigated in subsequent empirical
research.
179. See Johnson & Drobnev, Proximity Biases in the Attribution of Civil Liability, 48 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 283 (1985); Kahneman & Tverskv, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOLOGICAL
REV. 237 (1973); R. NISBETT & L. Ross, supra note 67; Saks & Kidd, supra note 170; see generally THE
EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS (S. Fienberg ed. 1989); A.
PAIVIO, IMAGERY AND VERBAL PROCESSES (1971); Begg & Robertson, Imagery and Long Term Retention,
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The research data also suggest that when social framework evidence
precedes the relevant lay witness evidence, it tends to have a greater impact.
This result is consistent with other research on jury decisionmaking and with
additional bodies of social psychological literature.1 8 0
Research comparing the delivery of social framework information by
judicial instructions to delivery by means of expert testimony has been limited
to studies of information bearing on eyewitness reliability. These studies
indicate that delivery of social framework evidence through judicial
instructions will not be as effective as delivery by means of expert testimony.
More research is needed, however, to determine whether this finding can be
generalized and why judicial instructions prove less effective. The topic is of
particular importance given Walker and Monahan's proposal that judicial
instruction is the preferable vehicle for delivering social framework
evidence. 181
C.

The Impact of Science

The data in the studies reviewed in this article speak forcefully to the
assertion that jurors will be seduced by social framework evidence and accord
it an unwarranted aura of trustworthiness and reliability. The data include
interviews with actual jurors and simulations involving a number of kinds of
social science testimony. Jurors do not appear to suspend their own judgment
in deference to the expert. The expert's testimony is evaluated in light of the
juror's own experience, common sense, and recognition of the adversarial

nature of the trial process.
A limited number of simulations studying rape victim testimony and
eyewitness expert testimony have included conditions involving conflicting
expert testimony. These studies led the researchers to conclude that the

jurors were not confused by a "battle of experts."
The existing studies have not directly addressed the question of whether
jurors are capable of understanding the scientific rationale that underlies the
various types of social framework evidence. The work of Thompson and
others 82 indicates that jurors may misunderstand probabilistic evidence; yet
probabilistic estimates lie at the heart of much social framework research. To
the extent that a scientific critique of social framework evidence becomes an
issue that jurors are called upon to judge at trial, there could be a problem.
However, the methods for deriving social framework evidence may be easier
for jurors to grasp intuitively than the methods for fingerprint or hair-sample
matching. Research is needed on this issue.

180.
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Elwork, Sales & AlfiniJuridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, I LAw & HUM.

163 (1977).

181. See Walker & Monahan, supra note 1.
182. See Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 172;J. Goodman, supra note 167; Thompson, supra note
171; see generally Saks & Kidd, supra note 170.
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Impact on Other Evidence and Decision Standards

This heading involves issues such as whether social framework testimony
might affect the weight that jurors give to other trial evidence, cause them to
draw legally inappropriate conclusions about a witness' character, or cause
them to misunderstand the law. In Part III.C we hypothesized that because
jurors proactively develop story schemas in arriving at their verdicts, we
should expect some spillover effects on other evidence. Some of the studies
address the magnitude and extent of that spillover.
As predicted, the various sets of data did show some spillover effects, but
the magnitude of the effects was relatively small. For example, Brekke's study
of rape trauma syndrome testimony found that the evidence affected
assessments of the complainant's credibility and character. However, in
comparison to no-expert control conditions, the testimony had only minor
effects on the jurors' ratings of the defendant's character. Similarly, Schuller
found that while testimony about the battered woman syndrome increased
jurors' beliefs in the defendant's credibility and honesty, it had no statistically
significant effect on the perception or evaluation of the deceased husband.
The research described by Penrod and Cutler involving eyewitness reliability
indicated that while expert evidence caused jurors to be more sensitive to
witness viewing conditions, it did not cause them to give extra weight to
factors irrelevant to the witness in question. Finally, Schuller's study
indicated that jurors' understanding of the legal verdict categories did not
differ as a consequence of the expert testimony.
The total number of studies that have directly addressed the issues raised
under this rubric is limited. Nevertheless, our tentative conclusion is that
from a statistical perspective, the spillover effects of social framework
evidence are not large. We leave to legal decisionmakers the question of what
constitutes undue impact.
E.

Excessive Impact on the Determination of Credibility

The accumulated data from the various studies reviewed in this article lend
no support to the argument that jurors allow the expert evidence about social
frameworks to substitute for their own judgments about the credibility of a lay
witness. The central purpose of social framework evidence is to help jurors
assess credibility; and to the extent that the evidence bolsters or detracts from
the relevant witness's evidence, we would expect it to influence credibility
judgments. Thus, the key issue is whether it affects those judgments directly
or indirectly. Given that, under the law, the jury is granted ultimate
responsibility for assessing credibility, it would be preferable that the effects
be indirect.
With respect to evidence about battered woman syndrome, Schuller's
study suggests that the effects of social framework testimony are in fact
indirect. Schuller's analysis of jury deliberations showed that while jurors
discussed matters such as the woman's ability to leave the setting, her
perceptions of fear and danger, her intentions, and the extent to which she
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was in control of her actions, the issue of her general credibility accounted for
less than 3 percent of deliberation time. Other studies we reviewed, which
used different methodologies, are consistent with these results, as are the
findings that jurors treat social science experts with appropriate caution.
Before concluding, we need to address the methodological limitations and
weaknesses of the research studies. Such a discussion is important for two
reasons. First, any weaknesses in methodology constrain our ability to
extrapolate from the findings. Second, because the empirical investigation of
jury behavior is an ongoing process, it is to be hoped that methodological
criticisms will spur improvements in future studies.
The most serious limitations of the body of literature reviewed in this
article is that the vast bulk of the studies involve simulations. The results,
therefore, might have limited applicability to the conditions under which real
juries operate.' 83 For example, simulating juries typically are faced with an
abbreviated trial situation that is less rich than that experienced by real
jurors. Instead of watching live witnesses, lawyers, and judges, the jurors read
a transcript, listen to an audiotape, or view a videotape. Further, their
verdicts are hypothetical; the decisions have no real consequences.
Lawyers frequently criticize jury research on these grounds, and to some
extent the criticism is valid. Yet, in this instance a spirited defense can be
made of the research literature. First, we are not dealing with just one or two
simulation studies but a large number, varied in substantive topics and
involving diverse subject populations and methodologies. Despite the
heterogeneity of the studies, consistent trends emerged. Second, the results
of the studies that involved actual jurors were generally consistent with the
results of the simulated jury studies. Third, the findings are consistent with
more general bodies of social psychological theory and research about human
decisionmaking processes. This last point is particularly germane, since the
assertions that judges and other legal scholars have made about jury behavior
are, after all, hypotheses about psychological mechanisms underlying juror
decisionmaking. Many of the simulation studies address these posited
psychological mechanisms. In the absence of the ability to observe actual jury
deliberations, simulation studies provide the next best approximation.
While we would subscribe to the defense of the literature and the
conclusions that we have drawn from it, some important weaknesses must be
noted. There have been no attempts to interview real jurors who have served
in trials involving matters where social framework evidence might be relevant.
Particularly when expert evidence has been tendered, the reactions and
observations of jurors could provide much insight about the impact of such
testimony. In most of the simulation studies the jurors have been presented
183. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 73; Bray & Kerr, Use of Simulation
Method in the Study of Jury Behavior: Some Methodological Considerations, 3 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 107
(1979); Konecni & Ebbesen, External Validity of Research in Legal Psychology, 3 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 39
(1979); Vidmar, The Other Issues in Jury Simulation Research:. A Commentary with ParticularReference to
Defendant Character Studies, 3 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 95 (1979); Wells, supra note 60.
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with minimal trial evidence; more realistic materials could have been
developed. There has been an unwarranted emphasis on the responses of
individual jurors when the actual focus of concern is how twelve (or six) men
and women pool their insights to reach a decision. Both legal and
psychological hypotheses ultimately focus on the deliberation process.' 8 4 Yet
most empirical researchers have only made inferences about the deliberations
from the variables manipulated in the experiments and from the resulting
verdicts. Finally, the empirical research has often not directly addressed the
various legal concerns that we attempted to tease out and articulate in Part III
of this article. As further efforts are made to understand how juries respond
to social framework evidence, it is to be hoped that these deficiencies will be
corrected.
In this review, our task has been confined to the question of how juries are
likely to respond to expert evidence of the sort that Walker and Monahan
have labelled social framework evidence. We have largely avoided the issue of
whether the scientific foundation of the evidence is solid. We have also
avoided policy considerations, other than jury competence, that judges may
consider in weighing its admissibility. Although we have drawn on research
literature assessing jury reactions to other types of expert evidence, our
conclusions should be seen as pertaining only to social framework testimony.
Also, we need to be cautious about generalizing beyond expert testimony
involving battered women, rape victims, and eyewitness reliability.
Nevertheless, our overall judgment from the body of literature that currently
exists is that expert testimony about social frameworks can be helpful to
juries. The data also indicate that jurors' use of the evidence is largely
confined to the legally appropriate functions it is intended to serve.

184. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 73, at 53; Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads
Better than One?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 205; Holstein,jurors' Interpretationsand
Jury Decision Making, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 83, 84 (1985); Wells, supra note 60.

